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This paper analyzes sophisticated dynamic choice for ambiguity-sensitive decision makers. It
characterizes Consistent Planning via axioms on preferences over decision trees. Furthermore, it
shows how to elicit conditional preferences from prior preferences. The key axiom is a weakening of
Dynamic Consistency, deemed Sophistication. The analysis accommodates arbitrary decision mod-
elsandupdatingrules. Hence,theresultsindicatethat(i)ambiguityattitudes,(ii)updatingrules,and
(iii) sophisticated dynamic choice are mutually orthogonal aspects of preferences.
As an example, a characterization of prior-by-prior Bayesian updating and Consistent Planning
for arbitrary maxmin-expected utility preferences is presented. The resulting sophisticated MEU
preferences are then used to analyze the value of information under ambiguity; a basic trade-off be-
tween information acquisition and commitment is highlighted.
Web Appendix available athttp://faculty.econ.northwestern.edu/faculty/siniscalchi
Note: for convenience, this ﬁle includes both the paper (pp 1–47) and the Web Appendix (pp. i–xiii).
1 Introduction
This paper provides robust behavioral foundations for sophisticated dynamic choice in the presence of
ambiguity. It departs from the existing literature on dynamic choice under uncertainty by assuming that
the objects of individuals’ preferencesare decision trees, rather than uncertain prospects (“acts”) or con-
tingent consumption plans (“temporal acts”). This approach avoids a tension between ambiguity and
coherent dynamic choice that arises if preferences over acts are taken as the only behavioral primitive.
Tohighlightthistension,recallthatEllsberg[6]demonstratedthatambiguitymanifestsitselfthrough
violations of the Sure-Thing principle—the central axiom in Savage’s axiomatic foundation for expected-
utility theory. But, as Savage himself emphasizes, the Sure-Thing Principle also provides a foundation
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1for Bayesian updating, and ensures that the resulting conditional preferences are dynamically consis-
tent (cf. Savage [35], pp. 21–22 and 43–33; see also Ch. 10 in Kreps [27], and Ghirardato [11]). Mod-
els of ambiguity-sensitive preferences, such as Gilboa and Schmeidler’s [12] “maxmin-expected utility”
(MEU) or Schmeidler’s [36] “Choquet-expected utility” (CEU) necessarily relax the Sure-Thing principle;
as might be expected in light of the preceding observation, updating rules for these decision models (e.g.
Gilboa and Schmeidler [13], Jaffray [20], Pires [33], Shafer [37] and Walley [42]) typically lead to viola-
tions of dynamic consistency. Indeed, Epstein and Le Breton [8] show that full dynamic consistency is
generally incompatible with non-neutral attitudes towards ambiguity.1
Dynamic consistency provides a simple rationale for backward induction. Speciﬁcally, it ensures
that a sequentially optimal plan of action in a decision tree will also be optimal from the point of view
of prior preferences, and conversely;2 thus, backward induction can be viewed as an efﬁcient way to
compute a-priori optimal plans. But, when dynamic consistency fails, a-priori optimal and sequentially
optimal plans may differ: an example is provided in §1.1 below. In such circumstances, the behavioral
implications of a theory that relies solely on prior and conditional preferences over acts are not fully de-
termined: will the individual follow her sequentially optimal plan, the a-priori optimal one, or a “com-
promise” plan? In fact, even testing whether an agent adopts a given dynamically-inconsistent updating
rule may be problematic if the latter does not fully determine her dynamic-choice behavior.3
The approach proposed in this paper avoids these difﬁculties. Dynamic Consistency is a property
of preferences over acts; on the other hand, the results in this paper rely primarily upon assumptions
on preferences over non-trivial decision trees, and hence are unaffected by departures from Dynamic
Consistency. As an added beneﬁt, the proposed approach can accommodate a wide range of decision
models and updating rules. To summarize the main results:
• Theorem 1 in Section 3.1 characterizes Consistent Planning for dynamic decision problems under
uncertainty. This reﬁnement of backward induction was introduced by R. H. Strotz [41] in the con-
text of intertemporal choice with changing tastes, and has also been successfully employed in the
setting of choice under risk: see e.g. Karni and Safra [21, 22], Caplin and Leahy [2]. These contri-
butions adopt Consistent Planning as a solution concept for decision trees, but do not provide an
axiomatic foundation.4 Theorem 1 provides such a foundation, formalizing the intuitive notion
that a sophisticated decision-maker correctly anticipates her future preferences.
• The characterization of Consistent Planning requires that the individual’s conditional preferences
1See also the discussion of Epstein and Schneider [9], Hanani and Klibanoff [18] and Klibanoff [24] in §1.4 below.
2Assuming all relevant conditioning events have positive prior probability.
3Note that conditional preferences cannot all be observed directly, especially in the kind of non-repeatable situations where
ambiguity is typically of greatest interest: if an event occurs, one cannot observe preferences conditional on its complement.
4Gul and Pesendorfer[15]have recently axiomatized versionsof Consistent Planning with changing tastes (under certainty).
2over trees be speciﬁed. Section 3.2 shows that, under suitable conditions, these can be elicited
from her prior preferences (Theorem 2). Together, Theorems 1 and 2 imply that, just like a coher-
ent theory of dynamic choice can be rationalized in terms of prior preferences over acts if these
conform to expected utility, a similarly coherent theory of dynamic choice can be founded upon
prior preferences over trees for more general decision models.
• To exemplify the approach described in this paper, Section 4.1 characterizes consistent planning
for arbitrary MEU preferences and prior-by-prior Bayesian updating (Theorem 3). In particular,
no restriction need be imposed on the set of priors. Section 4.2 then employs the resulting model
of “sophisticated MEU preferences” to analyze a simple value-of-information problem. Leverag-
ing the framework and results of this paper, the analysis illustrates that a basic trade-off between
information acquisition and commitment emerges under ambiguity.
As noted above, Theorems 1 and 2 require only relatively mild regularity conditions on preferences
over acts. Hence, the results in this paper suggest that (i) ambiguity attitudes, (ii) updating rules, and
(iii) sophisticated dynamic choice are essentially orthogonal aspects of behavior, which can be tested,
modeled and axiomatized independently.
It is also worth emphasizing that, while the characterization of Consistent Planning involves prefer-
ences over trees, its use as a solution concept only requires prior and conditional preferences over Savage
acts. Thus, in practice, when analyzing a dynamic choice problem, it is enough to specify the agent’s
prior preferences over acts and her updating rule, then apply Consistent Planning. The results in this pa-
per provide a rationale for this approach, regardless of ambiguity attitudes and choice of updating rules.
From a conceptual point of view, as will be emphasized below, Consistent Planning can also be viewed
as a way to “extend” the individual’s preferences from acts to arbitrary trees.
The remainder of this section documents the issues just discussed in speciﬁc examples; §1.4 dis-
cusses the related literature, including alternative approaches to dynamic choice under ambiguity. Sec-
tion2describestheformalframework. Section3containsthemainresultsonConsistentPlanning(§3.1)
and the elicitation of conditional preferences (§3.2). Section 4.1 considers the special case of MEU pref-
erences and prior-by-prior updating; a value-of-information application is in §4.2; ﬁnally, §4.3 discusses
Consistent Planning for inﬁnite trees (the formal treatment is in §B.2 of the Web Appendix).
1.1 When Dynamic Consistency Fails
Consider the dynamic decision problem in Figure 1. A decision-maker (DM henceforth) is presented
with an urn containing 90 balls, of which 30 are red and 60 green and blue, in unspeciﬁed proportions.
There are two prizes, $0 and $10; x denotes an arbitrary prize. A ball will be drawn from the urn; the
state space is denoted by Ω={r,g,b}, in obvious notation. If the ball drawn from the urn is blue, the DM
3receivesx. Otherwise, the DM is informed that the ball drawn is not blue, and can choose whether to bet
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Figure 1: The tree fx, representing deferred choice in the Ellsberg model; x ∈{0,10}.
Throughout this paper, “•” represents a decision node and “◦” corresponds to a point in the tree
where information is revealed to the DM (or, slightly improperly, a “chance node”). Trees are drawn from
left to right, and from top to bottom; edges departing from decision nodes are decorated with action
labels (A, R andG in Fig. 1), whereas edges departing from chance nodes are labelled with events ({r,g},
{b}, {r} and {g} in Fig. 1). The decision tree in Fig. 1 will be denoted fx.
The tree fx may be viewed as a menu of two plans: “choose A, then R” (denoted ARx) and “choose
A, thenG” (denoted AGx); see Fig. 2. Formally, a plan is a tree featuring a single action at every decision
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Figure 2: The plans ARx and AGx; x ∈{0,10}.
The tree fx contains two more subplans of interest: those beginning with the choice of R orG at the
second decision point. These are “conditional” subtrees: they incorporate the information that the ball
drawn was either red or green. For simplicity, in this section only, these subtrees (drawn in red and green
respectively in Figs. 1 and 2) will also be denoted by R andG; see §2 for a formal notation for subtrees.
Suppose that the DM has MEU preferences both ex-ante and after observing the event E = {r,g};
denote these preferences by ¼ and ¼E respectively. The DM’s utility function u satisﬁes u(10) = 10 and



















Thus, for all acts f ,g ∈ {0,10}Ω, f ¼ g if and only if minq∈C
R
u(f (ω))dq ≥ minq∈C
R
u(g(ω))dq, and
similarly f ¼E g if and only if minq∈CE
R
E u(f (ω))dq ≥minq∈CE
R
E u(g(ω))dq. The setCE is obtained by
updating every prior in C.
4Torankplans,adoptthestandardReductionassumption. AnyplancorrespondsnaturallytoaSavage
act; forinstance,ARx correspondstotheact(10, 0, x)thatyieldstheprizes10,0andx instatesr, g andb
respectively. Reduction postulates that the DM ranks plans by comparing the corresponding acts: thus,
AR0 AG0, and AR10 ≺AG10. (2)
Similarly, the subplans R and G correspond to restricted acts with domain E. The standard approach
is to assume that their ranking is determined solely by the comparison of these restricted acts given E,
regardless of whether one views R andG as subplans of f0 or f10. This assumption, which complements
Reduction, is called Consequentialism. It is adopted in most (but not all) existing work on conditional
preferences and dynamic choice under ambiguity: see §1.4 for details. In this example,
R E G. (3)
NotethatReductionisassumedhereforsimplicity,butitisnotrequiredforthemainresultsofthispaper.
The backward-induction analysis of the trees f0 and f10 is particularly simple. There is no choice to
be made at the initial node, so only the second decision point must be considered. Since R E G, the
inferior actionG can be pruned; the Backward Induction algorithm then terminates.
Thus, for every x ∈ {0,10}, the plan ARx is the “backward-induction solution” of the tree fx. Under
expectedutilityandBayesianupdating, abackward-inductionsolutionisalsooptimalfromtheperspec-
tive of prior preferences. However, in this example, this is not true for x = 10: the backward-induction
solution of the tree f10 is AR10, but Eq. (2) indicates that AR10 ≺ AG10. Because of this inconsistency,
it is not clear exactly what kind of behavior should be expected in the tree f10 on the basis of the act
preferences described above.
One way to avoid similar inconsistencies is to require that
∀x ∈{0,10}, R ¼E G ⇔ ARx ¼AGx. (4)
Eq. (4) is an implication of Dynamic Consistency; it is also clearly violated by the preferences considered
here (cf. Eqs 2 and 3). The key observation is that this violation is related to ambiguity; to see this, note
that Eq. (4) implies that AR0 ¼AG0 if and only if AR10 ¼AG10. By Reduction, this corresponds to
(10, 0, 0)¼(0, 10, 0) ⇔ (10, 0, 10)¼(0, 10, 10). (5)
Now recall that the modal preferences in Ellsberg’s original three-color-urn problem exhibit the pattern
(10, 0, 0)(0, 10, 0) and (10, 0, 10)≺(0, 10, 10); (6)
this is also the pattern exhibited by preferences in the example under consideration here.
5Tosummarize,inthissimpleexample,inordertoavoidinconsistenciesbetweenbackward-induction
and ex-ante analysis of the trees f0 and f10, it is necessary to rule out Ellsberg-type preferences. This is
an instance of the tension between ambiguity and dynamic consistency referred to in the Introduction;
indeed, a result emphasizing this tension was established in considerable generality by Epstein and Le
Breton [8] (see also Ghirardato [11]).
Eq. (4) also provides a way to elicit the conditional ranking of R andG from prior preferences: this is
ageneralpropertyofDynamicConsistency(cf. theobservationsattheendof§3.2.2). Ontheotherhand,
when Dynamic Consistency fails, even simply testing whether observed behavior conﬁrms to or contra-
dicts a given updating rule requires explicit additional assumptions on how the DM resolves conﬂicts
between prior and conditional preferences.
Toseethis,consideraDMwithMEUpreferencesandpriorsC asinEq. (1);however,assumenowthat
her set of posteriors is not known. An experimenter conjectures that she might be using the maximum-
likelihood updating rule (Gilboa and Schmeidler [13]);5 in this case her set of posteriors would reduce
to C0
E = {π}, where π({r}) =
1
3 and π({g}) =
2
3. For this posterior, G is strictly preferred to R given E.
Now assume that this DM chooses R in the tree f0. This can be interpreted in (at least) two ways: (i) the
DM’s behavior conforms to backward-induction, and she does not use maximum-likelihood updating;
or (ii) the DM’s behavior is driven by the prior preference AR0  AG0, so no conclusion can be drawn re-
garding her updating rule. Thus, even in this simple example, additional assumptions, such as Backward
Induction, are required to relate observed behavior to speciﬁc updating rules.
1.2 Consistent Planning, Sophistication and Weak Commitment
The overall objective of this paper is to show that, despite the potential inconsistency between ex-ante
and backward-induction analysis, it is still appropriate to employ backward induction to make speciﬁc
predictions about dynamic choice behavior. In particular, to avoid indeterminacies due to ties, Strotz’s
concept of Consistent Planning will be the focus of the analysis.
InStrotz’sownwords, ConsistentPlanningcapturestheassumptionthat, whenfacedwithaproblem
suchastheonedepictedinFig. 1, theDMwill“ﬁndthebestplanamongthosethat[s]hewillactuallyfol-
low.” [41, p.173] Like backward induction, Consistent Planning is an algorithm that iteratively constructs
a “solution” to the dynamic problem under consideration. However, when dynamic consistency fails,
backward induction no longer has a clear rationale, despite its intuitive appeal: surely it can no longer
be viewed as a way to construct ex-ante optimal plans. A fortiori, this is true for Consistent Planning,
which reﬁnes backward induction by incorporating a speciﬁc tie-breaking rule.
Theorem1providesasimplebehavioralcharacterizationofConsistentPlanningthataddressesthese
5This rule prescribes updating only those priors in C that maximize the probability of the conditioning event E.
6issues; this subsection reviews the two main axioms. As noted above, the behavioral assumptions un-
derlyingConsistentPlanningcanonlybeformalizedintermsoftheindividual’spreferencesovergeneral
trees. This is in the spirit of the literature on menu choice originating from Kreps [26]: by carefully con-
sidering the DM’s preferences over trees, it is possible to identify “benchmark” situations in which she
will, or will not, be able to carry out a-priori desirable future actions.
Consistent Planning can also be viewed as a way to extend the DM’s preferences from acts to general
trees; the statement of Theorem 1 and of the main axioms themselves support this view. To clarify, in the
example in Fig. 1, the fact that ARx is the Consistent-Planning solution of fx may be taken to imply that,
for each x ∈{0,10}, the tree fx is deemed equivalent to the plan ARx: fx ∼ARx. A further consequence is
that f0 ∼ f10—a statement about the DM’s preferences over trees.
The ﬁrst main axiom is Sophistication: loosely speaking, it requires that the DM hold correct expecta-
tions regarding her future choices. However, this intuition is formalized solely in terms of prior and con-
ditional preferences—there is no need to formally model the DM’s “beliefs” about her future preferences
and/or choices. For instance, in the tree fx of Fig. 1, Sophistication yields the following restrictions:
∀x ∈{0,10}, R E G ⇒ fx ∼ARx and G E R ⇒ fx ∼AGx (7)
Thatis: theDMevaluatesthetrees f10 and f0 asif theysimplydidnotcontainthecontinuationtreesthat
she will surely not choose. This indirectly reﬂects the DM’s correct beliefs about her future preferences.
Notice that, unlike Eq. (4), Eq. (7) does not impose any restriction on the relative ranking of ARx and
AGx; thus, a DM can satisfy (Reduction, Consequentialism and) Sophistication while at the same time
exhibiting the modal preferences in the Ellsberg paradox.
Also observe that Eq. (7) does not yield any restrictions in case R ∼E G. This is immaterial for the
preferences considered in §1.1, but may lead to indeterminacies in other settings; thus, a tie-breaking
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Figure 3: Sophistication and Weak Commitment
The state space is Ω = {r,g,b,w}; the DM has MEU preferences, with priors C = {π ∈ ∆(Ω) : π({r}) =
π({b}), π({g})=π({w})}. Also let E ={r,g} and suppose that conditional preferences ¼E are determined
by prior-by-prior Bayesian updating, so the set of posteriors is CE ={π∈∆(Ω):π({r})=1−π({g})}.
7Note that R ∼E G; thus, Sophistication has no bite in this decision tree. However, this DM strictly
prefers the act that yields 10 if g orb obtain, and 0 otherwise, to the act that yields 10 if r orb obtain, and
0 otherwise. Hence, a priori the DM would like to “commit” to choosingG at her second decision node.
Intuitively, allowing the DM to evaluate the tree f as if she could commit toG seems consistent with
the logic of “ﬁnding the best plan among those she will actually follow:” the DM will have no incentive
to deviate from the plan that prescribes G at her second decision node. The Weak Commitment axiom
captures precisely this assumption. Denote by AR and AG the plans obtained from f by pruning the
green and, respectively, the red subtrees; Weak Commitment then implies:
G ∼E R, AG AR ⇒ f ∼AG
(and similarly if AR  AG). That is: if, tomorrow, the DM will be indifferent between G and R, but today
she would like to be able to commit toG, then indeed she will able to—and consequently she evaluates
f as if the a priori inferior alternative R was not available. Again, observe that no restriction on prior
preferences over acts or plans is required.
It is worth emphasizing that Sophistication and Weak Commitment do not provide a rationale for
recursion, or replacing subtrees with the conditional certainty equivalent of the optimal continuation
plans: they only rationalize pruning conditionally inferior actions.
To see this, consider the tree f0 in Fig. 1 and the MEU preferences described in §1.1. To ensure the
existence of certainty equivalents, assume that the prize set is X = [0,10] and, for simplicity, that utility
is linear. Recall that R E G, so Consistent Planning implies that f0 ∼AR0. However, the conditional cer-
tainty equivalent of R is
10




3 , 0) is
10
9 , whereas (assuming
Reduction) the prior MEU evaluation of AR0 is
10
3 . Thus, the DM is not indifferent between f0 and f 0.
Recursion requires the full force of Dynamic Consistency: see Epstein and Schneider [9]. Informally,
under Consistent Planning, the DM evaluates her future choices “from today’s perspective”; recursion,
on the other hand, is only meaningful if today’s and tomorrow’s perspectives coincide.
1.3 Eliciting Conditional Preferences
Sophistication,togetherwithbasicstructuralassumptionsthatguaranteetheexistenceofcertaintyequiv-
alents,enablestheelicitationofconditionalpreferencesfrompriorpreferences. Consideronceagainthe
tree fx in Fig. 1 and the preferences in §1.1. To elicit the ranking of the subplans R andG conditional on
E ={r,g}, consider the trees ARx,y and AGx,y and the plan Ax,y in Fig. 4, where y ∈[0,1].
To clarify, the choice Y in the trees of Fig. 4 yields a certain payoff of y. The conditional MEU evalu-
ations of R andG are
10
3 and 0 respectively. Now ﬁx a prize z ∈(0,
10
3 ): then, for every y ≺z (equivalently,
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Figure 4: The trees ARx,y and AGx,y, and the plan Ax,y; x ∈{0,10}, y ∈[0,10].
she will prefer Y to G at the second node of AGx,y. Intuitively, the prize z serves as a “wedge” between
the plans R andG. Then Sophistication yields the following implications:
∀y ∈X : y ≺z ⇒ ARx,y ∼ARx and y z ⇒ AGx,y ∼Ax,y; (8)
the plan ARx is as in Fig. 2. Observe that Eq. (8) only involves prior preferences: in other words, under
Sophistication, Eq. (8) is a directly observable implication of the conditional preference ranking R E G.
This suggests the following approach: stipulate that R is revealed weakly preferred to G given E if
there exists a “wedge” prize z ∈ X such that Eq. (8) holds. In this example, any prize z ∈ (0,
10
3 ) satisﬁes
this condition; on the other hand, there is no prize z ∈ X for which y ≺ z implies AGx,y ∼ AGx and
y z implies ARx,y ∼Ax,y: hence,G is not revealed weakly preferred to R given E. Taken together, these
observations “reveal” that R E G.
Theorem 2 shows that, under suitable conditions, the notion of revealed conditional preference is
well-deﬁned and, loosely speaking, allows the analyst to elicit the DM’s “actual” conditional preferences.
As noted above, the required conditions do not signiﬁcantly restrict preferences over acts; thus, the ap-
proach proposed here applies to a variety of decision models and updating rules. Furthermore, Sophis-
tication is only required to hold for trees such as ARx,y and AGx,y: see §3.2 for details.
1.4 Related literature
A (small) sample of contributions on updating rules for MEU, CEU and other decision models are refer-
enced at the beginning of this Introduction.
Myerson [30] characterizes EU preferences and Bayesian updating for “conditional probability sys-
tems” by considering axioms on a collection of conditional preferences; Dynamic Consistency plays a
centralroleinhisanalysis. Skiadas[40]considersconditionalpreferencesoverpairsconsistingofastate-
contingentconsumptionplanandaninformationﬁltration,andaxiomatizesarecursiveexpected-utility
representation. A version of dynamic consistency is also central to his analysis.
Epstein and Schneider [9] characterize recursive MEU preferences over Savage-style acts. These au-
thors retain Consequentialism and, implicitly, Reduction, and restrict Dynamic Consistency to a ﬁxed,
pre-speciﬁed collection of events. In particular, they analyze dynamic choice in decision trees generated
9byaﬁxedﬁltration,orsequenceofpartitions;DynamicConsistencyisrequiredtoholdforallpreferences
conditional upon elements of these partitions. A related approach is investigated in Wang [43].
Consistently with the preceding discussion, this results in a restriction on prior preferences; in par-
ticular, it can be shown that, under the assumptions in [9], Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle and Eq. 4 will
hold for all events the DM can condition upon. Loosely speaking, this rules out Ellsberg-type behavior
with respect to “learnable” events; for instance, in the tree fx of Fig. 1, the axioms in [9] rule out Ellberg-
type prior preferences (a fact that is also noted by Epstein and Schneider). By way of comparison, an
objective of the present paper is precisely to avoid imposing any restriction on prior preferences.
The discussion in the preceding subsections indicates that the possibility of Ellsberg-type behavior
is precluded by the combination of Reduction, Consequentialism and Dynamic Consistency. Other au-
thors have explored retaining Dynamic Consistency while dropping the other two axioms. In particular,
to accommodate Dynamic Consistency, Klibanoff [24] drops Reduction, and also introduces a form of
state-dependenceofpreferencesoverprizes. Morerecently, HananiandKlibanoff[18]haveproposedan
updating rule for MEU preferences; their analysis drops Consequentialism (but maintains Reduction).
This paper should be viewed as complementary to these contributions. As noted above, the main
results of this paper (i.e. Theorem 1 and 2) do not assume Reduction. Also, the present paper does not
restrictattentiontoMEUpreferences, ortospeciﬁcupdatingrules. Indeed, aswasmentionedabove, the
results in this paper indicate that the analysis of updating is essentially orthogonal to the characteriza-
tion of sophisticated behavior in decision tres.
Assuming that preferences are deﬁned over decision trees is much in the same spirit as Kreps’s sem-
inal contribution on menu choice (Kreps [26]) and the temporal resolution of uncertainty (Kreps [28]).
Gul and Pesendorfer [15] analyze the behavioral foundations of changing tastes in a model of tempo-
ral choice under certainty; as in the present paper, preferences are deﬁned over intertemporal decision
problems. Epstein [7] adopts a menu-choice framework to study “non-Bayesian” updating. Klibanoff
and Ozdenoren [25] characterize a subjective version of Kreps’s [28] model of recursive expected utility;
their decision setting is related to the one adopted here.
Versions of Consistent Planning have also been used in the literature of dynamic choice under risk:
see for instance Karni and Safra [21, 22], who suggest the expression “behavioral consistency.” Cubitt,
Starmer and Sugden [5] compare different non-expected utility models under risk in a dynamic-choice
experiment, and ﬁnd that “behavioral consistency” outperforms alternative speciﬁcations. Caplin and
Leahy [2] analyze a class of problems where Consistent Planning admits a recursive formulation, and
provide a general existence result. Machina [29] provides a critical discussion of Consistent Planning
(“folding back”) under risk; some of his observations are arguably less applicable to dynamic choice un-
deruncertainty,andothers(suchasissuesrelatedtothevalueofinformation)canbeexpliciltyaddressed
once preferences are deﬁned over decision trees, as this paper proposes. None of these contributions
10provide an axiomatic analysis of backward induction or Consistent Planning.
Hammond[16,17]andCubitt[4]provideananalysisofConsequentialismandDynamicConsistency
in decision trees for EU preferences; see also Ghirardato [11] and, in a risk setting, Karni and Schmeidler
[23]. Sarin and Wakker [34] consider non-EU behavior in decision trees, and in particular investigate
the consequences of the assumption that prior and conditional preferences belong to the same class of
models (e.g. MEU, CEU, etc.).
2 Decision Setting
Thissectionintroducesthebasicnotationfordecisiontrees. TheaxiomsofSection3involvemodifyinga
tree at certain decision points in various ways. For this reason, a main objective of the notation adopted
here is to allow a precise, yet relatively straightforward formalization of such “tree-surgery” operations.
2.1 Histories and Trees
Decision trees are described adapting the notation for “perfect-information game trees” in Osborne-
Rubinstein [31].6 The basic building block in this formalism is the history: an ordered list of the DM’s
actions and “chance moves” that describes a possible (partial or complete) unfolding of occurrences in
thedecisiontreeunderconsideration. Speciﬁcally,theDM’sactionsarelabelsrepresentingchoicesavail-
able to the DM in a given period; chance moves represent information that the DM may receive at the
end of the period under consideration. Additionally, terminal histories indicate a prize, i.e. the ultimate
outcome of the DM’s actions and the resolution of uncertainty in the history under consideration. A
decision tree can then be represented simply as a set of partial and terminal histories.
Formally, ﬁx a set Ω of states, an algebra Σ of events, and a set X of prizes; assume the latter is a
connected separable topological space. Also ﬁx a set A of action labels (e.g. letters or sequence of letters,
numerals, etc.); assume that A is countably inﬁnite.7
Deﬁnition 1 A (partial) history of length T ≥0 starting at E ∈Σ is a sequence
h =[a1,E1,...,aT,ET],
such that, for all t = 1,...,T, at ∈ A and Et ∈ Σ, and E ⊃ E1 ⊃ ... ⊃ ET.8 A terminal history of length
6Fudenberg and Tirole [10] use a similar notation for “multistage games with observable actions”.
7The topological assumptions on X are only required for the purposes of eliciting conditional preferences; the cardinality
assumption on A are required in the proof of Theorem 1 (see §A.1.1 in the Appendix for details); it also ensures that Axiom 3.2
does not hold vacuously.
8Here and in the following, ⊂ denotes weak inclusion, and ( denotes strict inclusion; similarly for ⊃ and ).
11T ≥1 starting at E ∈Σ is a sequence
h =[a1,E1,...,aT−1,ET−1,x],
where, for t = 1,...,T − 1, at and Et are as above and x ∈ X. The empty history (a partial history) is
denoted by ;. The set of all partial histories starting at E ∈ Σ is denoted by HE; the set of all terminal
histories starting at E ∈Σ is denoted TE.
Table 1 deﬁnes additional terms and notation related to histories.
Notation Remarks and Examples
Lenght of history h λ(h) λ(;)=0.
Last action taken at history h ∈HE \{;} a(h) a([a1,E1,a2,E2])=a2
Last realized event in history h E(h) E([a1,E2,a2,E2])= E2; E([a1,E1,x])= E1;
if ; is viewed as an element of HE, E(;)= E.
Prize at terminal history h ∈TE ξ(h) ξ([a1,E1,a2,E2,x])=x
Subhistory of h =[a1,E1,...,aT,ET] ht =[a1,E1,...,at,Et] Note: requires t ≤T. h0 =;.
or h =[a1,E1,...,aT,ET,x]
Subhistory relation h0 ≤h Means ∃t :h0 =ht.
h0 <h Means h0 ≤h and h0 6=h.
Composition of histories [h,h0] [h,a,E],[h,x]. Needs h0 ∈HE(h) and E ⊂ E(h);
also h ∈HE if h0 6=;; [;,h]=[h,;]=h.
Table 1: Terms and notation for histories
Deﬁnition 2 Let E ∈Σ\{;}. A decision tree starting at E is a subset f of HE ∪TE such that
1. if h ∈ f and λ(h)>0, then hλ(h)−1 ∈ f ;
2. for every h ∈ f and every a ∈ A such that [h,a,F] ∈ f for some F ∈ Σ, the collection {F : [h,a,F] ∈
f } is a (possibly trivial) partition of E(h);
3. h ∈ f ∩TE if and only if there is no h0 ∈ f such that h <h0.
A tree f is ﬁnite if it is a ﬁnite set. The sets of all ﬁnite trees starting at E is denoted by FE.
By Condition 1, if a history h can occur in a tree, then all truncations h0 such that h0 ≤ h can
also occur; in particular, the empty history can occur (; ∈ f ). In Condition 2, the assumption that
{F : [h,(a,F)] ∈ f } is a partition of E(h) ensures that continuation histories are speciﬁed for every state
ω ∈ E(h). Finally, Condition 3 states that a history is terminal precisely when it is not followed by other
actions (or immediate prizes) in f .
12Section 3 focuses on ﬁnite trees; §4.3 discusses extensions of the main results to a class of inﬁnite
trees. Table 2 below deﬁnes additional useful notation.
Notation and Deﬁnition
Choices (actions and prizes) available at h ∈ f ∩HE C f (h)={a ∈A :∃F ∈Σ,[h,a,F]∈H}∪{x ∈X :[h,x]∈ f }
Information partition following h and c ∈C f (h) Ff (h,c)={F ∈Σ:[h,c,F]∈ f }.
Note: implies Ff (h,c)=; if c ∈C f (h)∩X.
Table 2: Additional notation for a decision tree f ∈ FE.
A number of special types of trees will now be described, both to clarify the notation and because
they will play a role in the analysis
Constant trees. The simplest possible tree corresponds to a prize to be received immediately. For-
mally, if x ∈ X, the constant tree corresponding to x is {;,[x]}. In the the following, we shall abuse
notation slightly and refer to such a tree simply as “x”.
(Simple)Savageacts. In thestandardSavage[35]setting, anact isaΣ-measurablemapϕ :Ω→X; an
act ϕ is simple if ϕ(Ω) is ﬁnite. For every simple Savage act ϕ, one can construct a corresponding tree f ∈
FΩ by choosing an arbitrary action label a ∈A and letting f ={;}∪{[a,ϕ−1(x)],[a,ϕ−1(x),x]:x ∈ϕ(Ω)}
Plans. A tree f ∈ FE is a plan if the set C f (h) is a singleton for every h ∈ f ∩HE. That is, there is a
unique choice at every decision point in f .
PartitionalTrees. A tree f ∈ FΩ is partitional if there is a sequence F1,...,FT of progressively ﬁner Σ-
measurable partitions of Ω such that all terminal histories have length T +1, and furthermore Ff (h,a)=
{F ∈Fλ(h)+1 : F ⊂ E(h)} for every non-terminal history h and action a ∈C f (h)∩A. Thus, in a partitional
tree, Nature’s moves are independent of the DM’s choices. Deﬁnition 2 allows for greater ﬂexibility; for
instance, it can describe a situation in which the DM can acquire different signals about the prevailing
state of the world.
Notation. For every E ∈Σ, the set of plans in FE will be denoted by F
p
E .
2.2 Preferences: Consequentialism and Relabeling
The main object of interest in this paper is a collection {¼E};6=E∈Σ of binary relations; in particular, for all
non-empty E ∈Σ, ¼E is a preference relation on FE. For notational simplicity, ¼Ω will be denoted by ¼.
BeforeturningtotheactualaxiomaticanalysisinSection3,itisworthcommentingontwoimportant
aspects of conditional preferences in the present framework. First, since each conditional preference ¼E
isdeﬁnedoverthesetofdecisiontreesstartingat E,Consequentialismisimplicitlyassumedthroughout.
13Second, two trees may, loosely speaking, share a common overall structure and payoffs, and differ
only in the choice of action labels at decision points; for instance, by replacing the action labels A,R,G
in the tree in Fig. 1 with, say, X,Y,Z, one obtains a new tree that has the same structure and yields
the same payoffs as the original one. Such trees are distinct objects in the formalism adopted here,
and preferences may in principle treat them differently. The following deﬁnition and assumption rule
out this possibility: it will be assumed that preferences over trees are invariant to relabeling. This is
necessary for a correct interpretation of the tie-breaking assumption (Axiom 3.2 in Sec. 3); moreover, it
seems intuitively consistent with the logic of backward induction and consistent planning.
Deﬁnition 3 Consider two trees f ,g ∈ FE. Then g is a relabeling of f , written “f ≈ g”, if there exists a
bijection ϕ : f → g such that
(i) for all h, ¯ h ∈ f , h ≤ ¯ h iff ϕ(h)≤ϕ(¯ h);
(ii) for all h ∈ f ∩HE, E(h)= E(ϕ(h));
(iii) for all h ∈ f ∩HE, a ∈C f (h), and D,D0 ∈Ff (h,a), a(ϕ([h,a,D]))=a(ϕ([h,a,D0]);
(iv) for all h ∈ f ∩TE, ξ(h)=ξ(ϕ(h)).9
Condition (i) requires that the relabeling ϕ preserve the ordering of histories: if h precedes ¯ h in f ,
then the same must be true of the histories corresponding to h and ¯ h in g. Condition (ii) requires that
corresponding histories in f and g terminate with the same event; similarly, Condition (iv) ensures that
the same payoffs are assigned at corresponding terminal histories. Finally, Condition (iii) ensures that
the same actions are available at corresponding terminal histories. Speciﬁcally, if there is an action a at a
history h of f that can be followed by two events D and D0, then there must be an action a0 at the history
h0 of g corresponding to h that can be followed by the same two events D and D0.
Relabeling is an equivalence relation; for this and other properties of relabeling, see Section A.1.1 in
the Appendix. It is now possible to formalize the assumption that “action labels don’t matter”:
Assumption 2.1 (Irrelevance of action labels) For all E ∈Σ and f ,g ∈ FE: f ≈ g implies f ∼E g.
2.3 Tree Surgery
Finally, the key notions of subtree, continuation tree and replacement tree will be formally introduced.
Since a decision tree is a set of histories, it is possible to formalize these relations and operations using
straightforward set-theoretic notions. Some of the axioms in Sec. 3 require modifying trees in speciﬁc
ways; the deﬁnitions in this subsection provide the basic formal language to describe such operations.
9Notice that (i)—(iv) imply further intuitive restrictions: in particular, by (i), h ∈ f ∩TE iff ϕ(h)∈ g ∩TE, so (iv) is well-posed.
Furthermore, ϕ(;)=; and λ(h)=λ(ϕ(h)) for all h ∈ f .
14Deﬁnition 4 A tree g ∈ FE is a subtree of f ∈ FE if g ⊂ f .
Observe that an arbitrary subset of f need not be a subtree of f —the above deﬁnition explicitly
requires that a subtree be a tree in its own right. Also notice that the deﬁnition implies that f and g can
only differ in that some actions available at certain histories of f are removed; however, no new terminal
histories are introduced (i.e. not all actions available at a history can be removed).
Deﬁnition 5 Consider a tree f ∈ FE and a h ∈ f . The continuation tree beginning at h, denoted f (h), is
the set {h0 ∈HE(h) ∪TE(h) :[h,h0]∈ f } if h ∈HE, and the set {;,[ξ(h)]} if h ∈TE.
Thus, if h is a partial history, the continuation tree f (h) contains all the histories h0 such that [h,h0]
is a history of f ; if instead h is terminal and in particular the tree f yields the prize x at h, then the only
possible “continuation” for f at h is the (degenerate) tree that yields x with certainty and immediately.
Notice that, according to this deﬁnition, for h =;, f (h)= f .
Additional notation: The preceding two notions can be usefully combined to characterize “partial”
continuation trees. Formally, consider f ∈ FE, a non-terminal history h ∈ f ∩HE and a set B ⊂C f (h) of
actions and prizes available at h in the tree f . Then f (h,B) denotes the (unique) ⊂-maximal element of
FE(h) such that f (h,B)⊂ f (h) and C f (h,B)(;)= B.
For simplicity, if B ={c} for c ∈C f (h), I shall write f (h,c) in lieu of f (h,{c}).
Deﬁnition 6 Consider a tree f ∈ FE, a non-terminal history h ∈ f ∩HE, and another tree g ∈ FE(h). The
replacement tree gh f ∈ FE is the collection {h0 ∈ f : h 6≤h0}∪{[h,h0] : h0 ∈ g}.
That is: gh f comprises all histories in f that do not weakly follow h, plus all histories obtained by
concatenating h with histories in g. If h =;, then gh f = g.
3 Axioms and Results
It is now possible to present the main results of this paper. Subsection 3.1 provides a characterization of
Consistent Planning (Theorem 1); Subsection 3.2 shows that, under suitable assumptions, conditional
preferences can be derived from prior preferences (Theorem 2).
From a formal standpoint, the material in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 is essentially orthogonal. For in-
stance,theassumptionsrequiredfortheelicitationresultofTheorem2allowforconsiderabledepartures
from sophistication (and weak commitment); for another example, see Footnote 14 below.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
153.1 A decision-theoretic analysis of Consistent Planning
Subsection 3.1.1 formalizes the Sophistication and Weak Commitment axioms discussed in the Intro-
duction, as well as an additional required axiom; the deﬁnition of Consistent Planning and the charac-
terization result are provided in §3.1.2.
3.1.1 Sophistication, Weak Commitment and Simpliﬁcation
As discussed in the Introduction, Sophistication reﬂects the assumption that the DM correctly antici-
pates her future preferences, and recognizes that she will not be able to carry out plans that involve
conditionally dominated actions at future histories. To capture its implications solely in terms of the in-
dividual’s preferences, without explicitly modeling her introspective beliefs, it is enough to assume that
pruning conditionally dominated actions leaves the DM indifferent.
The notation introduced in §2.3 makes it easy to formalize this assumption. Recall that any choice
c available at a non-terminal history h of a tree f corresponds to a continuation tree, denoted f (h,c).10
Thus, choice b (strictly) dominates choice w at history h if f (h,b) E(h) f (h,c). If B is a collection of
(strictly undominated) actions available at h, then f (h,B) is the subtree of f (h) corresponding to these
undominated actions, and f (h,B)h f is the subtree of f obtained by pruning actions available at h but
not in the set B.11 The interpretation of the following axiom should now be straightforward:
Axiom 3.1 (Sophistication) For all f ∈ FE, all h ∈ f ∩HE, and all B ⊂ C f (h): if, for all b ∈ B and w ∈
C f (h)\ B, f (h,b)E(h) f (h,w), then f ∼E f (h,B)h f .
It is worth emphasizing that Axiom 3.1 also applies to h = ;, the initial history. For this special case,
the axiom is a version of the usual “strategic rationality” property of standard menu preferences (Kreps
[27]).12 Sophistication allows for the possibility that actions at future histories might be tempting for
future preferences,eventhoughtheyareunappealingforinitial preferences(orviceversa). However,the
availabilityofchoicesattheinitial historyof f thataredeemedinferiorgiventhesameinitial preference
relation ¼E is considered neither harmful (as might be the case if the DM were subject to temptation)
nor beneﬁcial (as it would be for a DM who has a preference for ﬂexibility). This assumption makes
it possible to focus on deviations from standard behavior due solely to differences in information and
perceived ambiguity at distinct points in time; it abstracts away from differently motivated deviations.
It should also be noted that Axiom 3.1 is meaningful even in case the history h is “irrelevant” in the
tree f . More precisely, two cases must be considered. First, suppose that the history h is not reached in
10Recall that the choice c may be a prize in X; in this case f (h,c) is a degenerate tree, as noted in the preceding subsection.
This does not affect the discussion in the text.
11Thus, not all dominated actions need be pruned.
12Recall that this section only considers ﬁnite trees.
16thetree f becauseofchoicestheDMmakespriortoh. Inthiscase,asophisticatedDMshouldanticipate
that h will not be reached; consequently, removing alternatives at h that the DM would not have chosen
should not affect her evaluation of the tree f .13 This is precisely what Axiom 3.1 requires.
Second, if the DM does not expect the event E(h) to occur, then she will be indifferent between
trees that only differ in case this event occurs (indeed, this is what is usually meant by “null event”).
The behavioral restriction imposed by Axiom 3.1 takes the form of an indifference, and so it is clearly
consistent with this, regardless of how preferences conditional on E(h) are deﬁned.14
Analogous observations hold for the remaining two axioms, Weak Commitment and Simpliﬁcation.
As noted in the Introduction, a tie-breaking rule may be required in addition to Sophistication. For
deﬁniteness, the assumption adopted here reﬂects a notion of one-period-ahead commitment. Refer
back to the tree in Fig. 3, henceforth denoted f . Recall that, conditional upon learning that the ball
drawn is red or green, the DM is indifferent between the actions R and G; however, ex-ante, she would
like to commit to R. In this case, it will be assumed that the DM “can” in fact carry out her plan and
choose R upon learning that the event {r,g} has occurred. More precisely, the DM evaluates the tree in
Fig. 3 as if she could indeed commit to choosing R.
As was the case for Sophistication, this interpretation implicitly involves the DM’s beliefs about her
own future preferences. However, it is possible to formalize one-period-ahead commitment solely in
terms of the DM’s preferences. To do so, the notion of a one-period-commitment version of a tree is
required. Again, refer to the tree in Fig. 3, and consider a modiﬁed tree where the action A at the ini-
tial history ; is replaced by two actions, labelled AR and AG. If the event {r,g} occurs and the DM has
chosen AR, then only the action R is available to the DM: more precisely, the continuation tree fol-
lowing [AR,{r,g}] equals f ([A,{r,g}],R). Similarly, the continuation tree following [AG,{r,g}] equals
f ([A,{r,g}],G). The resulting tree, denoted by g henceforth, is depicted in Fig. 5.
Relative to the original tree f , the modiﬁed tree g allows the DM to commit at the initial history to a
speciﬁc choice of action in the following period. For this reason, g is deemed a one-period commitment
versionofthetree f .15 Axiom3.2belowrequiresthattheDMbeindifferentbetween f anditsone-period-
commitment version g at the initial node. That is: the structure of the original tree f does not offer
the possibility of commitment at the initial history; yet, the DM evaluates it f “as if she could actually
13On the other hand, removing alternatives at h that the DM would choose might lead the DM to reoptimize and take actions
that no longer prevent history h from being reached. As can be seen, Axiom 3.1 is silent in these cases.
14 Thestandardapproachistoassumethat g ∼E(h) g 0 forall g,g 0 ∈ FE(h) (which,forinstance,followsfromthecharacterization
of conditional preferences in Sec. 3.2). Axiom 3.1 holds trivially in this case; indeed, notice that the Axiom would also be
satisﬁed if ¼E itself was trivial (i.e. if E was null for the ex-ante preference). However, for instance, Myerson [30] assumes that
non-trivial preferences conditional on every non-empty event are given. Axiom 3.1 accommodates this possibility, too.
15As will be clear momentarily, f admits many one-period commitment versions, but these only differ in the action labels
























Figure 5: One-period commitment version of Fig. 3
commit” to R (or, for that matter, G). Jointly with Sophistication, this axiom captures the intuition that
the DM expects to be able to carry out her preferred one-period-ahead plan.
The tree in Fig. 3 has three simplifying characteristics. First, there are only two decision epochs—
“time 0”, corresponding to the initial history ;, and “time 1”, corresponding to history [A,{r,g}]. Thus,
there is no distinction between one-period and full commitment. Second, there is only one time-1 his-
tory where the DM has to make a choice. Third, there is only one action available to the DM at the initial
history. A general notion of one-period commitment must allow for more than two decision epochs, for
multiple time-1 decision points, and for multiple actions available at ;.
As a ﬁrst step, the following deﬁnition identiﬁes subtrees of a general tree f that feature exactly one
action at every (non-terminal) time-0 and time-1 history, and otherwise coincide with f .
Deﬁnition 7 Consider an event E ∈ Σ\{;} and a tree f ∈ FE. A tree ¯ g ∈ FE allows one-period commit-
ment in f if ¯ g ⊂ f and, for all h ∈ ¯ g ∩HE, λ(h)≤1 implies |C ¯ g(h)|=1, and λ(h)=2 implies ¯ g(h)= f (h).
Thatis,atree ¯ g allowsone-periodcommitmentin f if(i)itisasubtreeof f ;(ii)itfeaturesonlyonechoice
at the initial history, and at any non-terminal history of length one; and (iii) agrees with f otherwise.
The one-period commitment version of a tree f can now be deﬁned as a new tree g that, loosely
speaking, “contains” all subtrees ¯ g that allow one-period commitment in f (and no other subtree). No-
tice that one-period commitment versions are only identiﬁed up to relabeling.
Deﬁnition 8 A tree g ∈ FE is a one-period commitment version of f ∈ FE iff
(i) for every tree ¯ g that allows one-period commitment in f there is a unique a ∈ Cg(;) such that
g(;,a)≈ ¯ g; and
(ii) for every a ∈Cg(;) there is a tree ¯ g that allows one-period commitment in f such that g(;,a)≈ ¯ g.
18Notice that, since A is assumed to be countably inﬁnite, every (ﬁnite) tree g ∈ FE admits at least one
(indeed, inﬁnitely many) trees that satisfy Def. 8.
The notion of one-period-ahead commitment discussed above can now be formalized. Consider a
tree f and a history h ∈ f , and suppose that, at every history h0 that immediately follows h, the DM is
conditionally indifferent among all available actions; then replacing the continuation tree f (h) with one
of its one-period-commitment versions g must leave the DM indifferent ex-ante:
Axiom 3.2 (Weak Commitment) For all f ∈ FE and all histories h ∈ f : if, for all h0 ∈ f with h < h0
and λ(h0) = λ(h) + 1, and all c,c0 ∈ C f (h0), f (h0,c) ∼E(h0) f (h0,c0), then f ∼E gh f for all one-period
commitment versions g ∈ FE(h) of f (h).
One last simple axiom is required. Consider a tree f ∈ FE, and suppose that the DM is indifferent
among all actions available at the initial history. Then, again at the initial history, the tree f should be
deemed equivalent to a subtree f 0 where one or more (but not all!) initial actions have been removed.
Axiom 3.3 (Simpliﬁcation) Forall f ∈ FE: if, forallc,c0 ∈C f (;), f (;,c)∼E f (;,c0), thenforallnon-empty
B ⊂C f (;), f ∼E f (;,B).
Two observations are in order. First, Simpliﬁcation is not implied by the previous axioms. Second,
consider a tree f ∈ FE and a non-terminal history h of f . If the DM is indifferent among all actions
available at h, then Simpliﬁcation requires that f (h) ∼E(h) f (h,A) for all non-empty subsets A of actions
at h. However, ex-ante, it may well be the case that the DM would strictly prefer, to have certain actions
removed or not removed at h. Refer to the tree in Fig. 3: conditional upon observing {r,g}, the DM is
indifferentbetweenR andG;however,exante,shestrictlyprefersthatactionR beavailableatthesecond
decision point. Formally, if h = [A,{r,g}], then, consistently with Simpliﬁcation, f (h) ∼{r,g} f (h,G):
however, f  f (h,G)h f , i.e. a priori the DM dislikes being forced to chooseG at h.
3.1.2 Formulation and Characterization of Consistent Planning
AsnotedintheIntroduction,Strotz’snotionof“consistentplanning”correspondstobackwardinduction
with a particular tie-breaking rule. The following deﬁnition provides the details.
Deﬁnition 9 (Consistent Planning) Consider a tree f ∈ FE. For every terminal history h ∈ f ∩ TE, let






E(h) : ∃c ∈C f (h) s.t. Cp(;)={c}, Fp(;,c)=Ff (h,c) and






f (h) : ∀p0 ∈CP0
f (h), p ¼E(h) p0
o
.
19A plan p ∈ FE is a consistent-planning solution of f if p ∈CPf (;).
Consistent Planning inductively associates a set of continuation plans to each history in a decision
tree f . Def. 9 is modeled after analogous deﬁnitions in Strotz [41] and Gul and Pesendorfer [15], except
thatitisphrasedintermsofpreferences,ratherthanviatheirnumericalrepresentation. Tofurtherclarify
how Consistent Planning operates, it is useful to rephrase Def. 9 as an algorithm, as follows.
1. First, deﬁne CPf (·) for each terminal history h of f as the singleton set consisting solely of the
(degenerate) plan f (h), which corresponds to the outcome that f delivers at h (cf. §2.1).
2. Next,supposethatCPf hasbeendeﬁnedforacollectionofhistories f done ⊂ f .16 NowdeﬁneCPf (·)
for histories h that are immediately followed only by histories in f done, as follows:
(a) Deﬁne CP0
f (h) as the set of plans that choose one of the alternatives available in tree f at
historyh,andthencontinueinamannerconsistentwithpreviousiterationsofthealgorithm;
(b) Next, deﬁne CPf (h) as the set of ¼E(h)–best elements in CP0
f (h).
3. Repeat Step 2 until CPf (·) has been deﬁned for all histories in f .
Four features and immediate consequences of the preceding deﬁnition need to be emphasized:
1. Consistent Planning only requires that complete and transitive preferences over plans be speciﬁed:
to see this, observe that the deﬁnition of CPf (h) only requires comparisons of plans, not general trees.
This feature of Def. 9 is essential, as a main objective of the present approach is to employ Consistent
Planning to extend preferences from plans to arbitrary trees.
2. For all f ∈ FE, the set CPf (;) of consistent-planning solutions of f is non-empty, provided prefer-
ences over plans are complete and transitive. This follows immediately by noting that each set CP0
f (h) is
ﬁnite. See §4.3 for a discussion of inﬁnite trees.
3. For every history h, the plans in the set CPf (h) are mutually indifferent conditional on E(h). In
particular, all consistent-planning solutions of a tree are mutually indifferent. Provided the restriction
of each conditional preference ¼E to plans is complete and transitive, this follows directly from Def.
9, regardless of whether or not the system of conditional preferences under consideration satisﬁes the
axioms of this section. Again, if this was not the case, it would not be possible to employ Consistent
Planning to extend preferences over plans to preferences over trees.
16To clarify, f done is typically not a tree itself. For instance, immediately after completing the ﬁrst step in the algorithm, f done
is deﬁned as the set of all terminal histories in f .
204. Consistent Planning does not replace optimal continuation plans with a “continuation value”, as
was noted in Sec. 1.2 of the Introduction. Rather, the Consistent Planning procedure interatively deletes
inferior continuation plans.17
The main result of this paper may now be stated. It states that preferences over plans can be ex-
tended to preferences over trees via Def. 9 if and only if the system of conditional preferences under
consideration satisﬁes Sophistication, Weak Commitment and Simpliﬁcation.
Theorem 1 Consider a system of preferences {¼E};6=E∈Σ that satisfy Assumption 2.1 and such that, for
every non-empty E ∈Σ, ¼E is a complete and transitive binary relation on F
p
E . Then the following state-
ments are equivalent.
1. For every non-empty E ∈ Σ, ¼E is complete and transitive on all of FE; furthermore, Axioms 3.1,
3.2 and 3.3 hold;
2. for any E ∈ Σ, and every pair of trees f ,g ∈ FE: f ¼E g if and only if p ¼ q for some (hence all)
p ∈CPf (;) and q ∈CPg(;).
3.2 Eliciting Conditional Preferences
As can be seen from Eq. (4) in the Introduction, Dynamic Consistency also provides a way to elicit con-
ditional preferences over acts from prior preferences over acts; indeed, it characterizes Bayesian updat-
ing for expected-utility preferences. This subsection establishes a similar result in the setting of choice
amongtrees: Sophisticationprovidesawaytoelicitconditionalpreferencesoveractsandtreesfromprior
preferences over trees. A weak form of Sophistication actually sufﬁces.
3.2.1 Revealed Conditional Preferences over Trees
To this end, the notion of test tree is useful. Consider an event E ∈Σ. In order to elicit preferences condi-
tional on E from prior preferences, one clearly needs to consider trees in which the DM can potentially
receive the information that E has occurred, and has to make a choice conditional upon E: formally,
one is led to focus on trees f ∈ FΩ such that E(h) = E for some h ∈ f ∩H . But even if a tree f contains
one such history h, it may be the case that the DM wishes to avoid reaching them, and is able to do so
by choosing suitable actions at histories preceding h. An E-test tree is, intuitively, the simplest tree in
which the DM “has” to face a decision conditional on E (provided of course E obtains): there is a single
initial action, and E is one of the events that may follow it. Formally:
17Indeed, since no solvability assumption is made in this subsection, conditional certainty equivalents may fail to exist.
21Deﬁnition 10 Let E ∈ Σ. A tree g ∈ FΩ is an E-test tree iff Cg(;) = {a} for some a ∈ A and E ∈ Fg(;,a).
The set of E-test trees is denoted by TE; furthermore, for all f ∈ FE and g ∈ TE, “fEg” denotes the tree
f[a,E]g, where Ag(;)={a}.
Also, as in the case of expected-utility preferences, conditioning events must “matter” to the DM in
order for any updating or elicitation rule to be meaningful; the relevant notion is formalized below.
Deﬁnition 11 An event E ∈ Σ is non-null (for ¼) iff, for all trees g ∈ TE, and for all x,x0 ∈ X with x  x0,
xEg x0
Eg.
The following notation simpliﬁes the statement of the axioms and the proposed updating rule.
Deﬁnition 12 Let E ∈Σ be non-null; ﬁx f ∈ FE and x ∈X. Then {f ,x} denotes the tree f ∪{[x]}∈ FE.
Deﬁnitions 10 and 12 will often be used together, as in “{f ,x}Eg” for a test tree g ∈TE.
As an example, consider the tree fx in Fig. 1, its subplans R andG starting at E ={r,g}, and the trees
ARx,y and AGx,y in Fig. 4. Then fx, ARx,y and AGx,y are all E-test trees. Furthermore, ARx,y = {R,y}E fx
and AGx,y ={G,y}E fx. Also, according to the preferences in §1.1, the event E is not null.
It is now possible to formalize the notion of revealed conditional preferences discussed in §1.3.
Deﬁnition 13 Let E ∈ Σ be non-null and consider f , f 0 ∈ FE and g ∈ TE. Then f is revealed weakly
preferred to f 0 given E and g, written f ¼∗
E,g f 0, iff there exists z ∈X such that
∀y ∈X, y z ⇒{f 0,y}Eg ∼yEg and z y ⇒{f ,y}Eg ∼ fEg.
Again, refer to §1.3; note that the plans ARx and AGx in Fig. 2 can be written as RE fx and GE fx respec-
tively. Then, taking g = fx, f =R and f 0 =G, the condition in Def. 13 corresponds to Eq. (8).
Two observations are in order. First of all, the above is simply a deﬁnition: without further assump-
tions, there is no guarantee that the relation ¼∗
E,g will be well-deﬁned, that it will not depend upon the
choice of test tree g, and in particular that it will coincide with the DM’s “actual” conditional preference
¼E, if one is given. However, as Theorem 2 below states, revealed conditional preferences do enjoy these
properties under suitable (and relatively weak) axioms.
Second, Def. 13 and the discussion that motivates it purposedly focus on the strict preferences y 
z, f E y and y E f 0, z  y. This avoids introducing speciﬁc assumptions about tie-breaking: in
particular, it is not necessary to assume even a restricted version of Weak Commitment (Axiom 3.2 in
Sec. 3.1.1). In addition to basic solvability and “taste consistency” requirements, only a limited form
of Sophistication is required to elicit conditional preferences. Incidentally, avoiding Weak Commitment
makes the extension of Theorem 2 to inﬁnite trees straightforward.18
18Also, assuming Weak Commitment does not substantially simplify the deﬁnition of revealed conditional preference.
223.2.2 Axioms and Characterization
Turn now to the formal characterization of conditional preferences. First, I formulate four “linkage”
axioms, relating prior and conditional preferences. The ﬁrst axiom states that preferences over prizes
(constant trees) are unaffected by conditioning.19
Axiom 3.4 (Stable Tastes) For all x,x0 ∈X, and all non-null E ∈Σ: x ¼E x0 if and only if x ¼x0.
The following two standard axioms ensure that conditional certainty equivalents exist (recall that X
is assumed to be a connected and separable topological space).
Axiom 3.5 (Conditional Dominance) For all non-null E ∈ Σ, f = (E,H,ξ) ∈ FE, and all x0,x00 ∈ X: if
x0 ¼ξ(z)¼x00 for all terminal histories z of f , then x0 ¼E f ¼E x00.
Axiom 3.6 (Conditional Prize-Tree Continuity) For all non-null E ∈ Σ and all f ∈ FE, the sets {x ∈ X :
x ¼E f } and {x ∈X :x ´E f } are closed in X.
Finally, I impose a relatively mild, but essential sophistication requirement. Informally, it assumes
“just enough” sophistication to ensure that the argument motivating Def. 13 is actually correct.
Axiom 3.7 (Weak Sophistication) For all non-null E ∈Σ, g ∈TE, f ∈ FE, and x ∈X:
x E f ⇒ {f ,x}Eg ∼xEg and x ≺E f ⇒ {f ,x}Eg ∼ fEg.
Axiom 3.7 is considerably weaker than the Sophistication axiom considered in Section 3.1. For instance,
consider a tree g that features two actions a,b at the initial history, such that a may be followed by E
(formally, [a,E] ∈ g). Then, even if one assumes that Axiom 3.7 holds, it is still possible that x E f
and {f ,x}[a,E]g ∼ f[a,E]g  x[a,E]g: in words, the DM naively expects to be able to stick to her ex-ante
preferred choice of f . Thus, the present approach makes it possible to address the distinct issues of
elicitation and sophistication in a relatively independent way.
Next, I formalize three “structural” axioms on prior preferences that ensure that the proposed deﬁni-
tionofrevealedconditionalpreferencesiswell-posed. ItmaybehelpfultorecallthatSavage’sSure-Thing
Principle (Postulate P2) plays a similar role for his deﬁnition of conditional preferences.20
The ﬁrst two axioms ensure the existence of “conjectural” certainty equivalents; they may be viewed
as the prior-preference counterpart to Axioms 3.5 and 3.6 above:
19For the present purposes, it would be sufﬁcient to impose this requirement on a suitably rich subset of prizes. For instance,
if X consists of consumption streams, it would be enough to restrict Axiom 3.4 to constant streams.
20 Actually, Savage himself restates P2 as follows: “for any [pair of acts] f and g and for every [event] B, f ≤ g given B or g ≤ f
given B” [35, inside back cover].
23Axiom 3.8 (Prize Continuity) For all ¯ x ∈X, the sets {x ∈X : x ¼ ¯ x} and {x ∈X : x ´ ¯ x} are closed in X.
Axiom 3.9 (Conjectural Dominance) Consider a non-null E ∈Σ, f ∈ FE, g ∈TE and x ∈X. Then:
(i) if ξ(z)x for all terminal histories z of f , then {f ,x}Eg ∼ fEg;
(ii) if ξ(z)≺x for all terminal histories z of f , then {f ,x}Eg ∼xEg.
Notice that Axiom 3.9 reﬂects considerations of sophistication and stability of preferences over out-
comes. To elaborate, if the individual’s preferences over X do not change when conditioning on E, then
in (i) she will not choose x after observing that E has occurred, because f yields strictly better outcomes
at every terminal history;21 similarly, in (ii), she will never choose f conditional on E. The indifferences
in (i) and (ii) thus reﬂect the assumption that the individual correctly anticipates her future choices.
The key assumption on unconditional preferences is a counterpart to Weak Sophistication:
Axiom 3.10 (Conjectural Separability) Consider a non-null E ∈Σ, f ∈ FE, g,g 0 ∈TE and x,y ∈X. Then:
(i) {f ,y}Eg 6∼ fEg and x y imply {f ,x}Eg 0 ∼xEg 0;
(ii) {f ,y}Eg 6∼yEg and x ≺y imply {f ,x}Eg 0 ∼ fEg 0.
To interpret this axiom, consider ﬁrst the case g = g 0 and ﬁx a prize y. According to the logic of sophisti-
cation, the hypothesis that {f ,y}Eg 6∼ fEg indicates that the DM believes that she will not strictly prefer
f to y given E—otherwise indifference would have to obtain. Thus, if x  y and the DM’s preferences
over X are stable, she will also strictly preferx to f given E; now sophistication yields the conclusion that
{f ,x}Eg ∼xEg. The interpretation of (ii) is similar.
Additionally, Axiom 3.10 implies that these conclusions are independent of the particular test tree
under consideration, and hence of what the decision problem looks like if the event E does not obtain.
In this respect, Axiom 3.10 reﬂects a form of “separablility,” much in the spirit of Savage’s Postulate P2.
Moregenerally,justlikeP2(cf. Footnote20),Axiom3.10essentiallyrequiresthattherevealedconditional
preference relation ¼∗
E,g be well-deﬁned and independent of the test-tree g.
The main characterization result can ﬁnally be stated.
Theorem 2 Consider the conditional preference system {¼E};6=E∈Σ. Assume that ¼ is a complete and
transitive relation on FΩ. Then the following statements are equivalent.
21 Recall that the trees under considerations are ﬁnite. For inﬁnite trees, Axiom 3.9 needs to be modiﬁed slightly [e.g. in (i)
one needs to assume that ξ(z)¼x0 for some x0 x, and similarly in (ii)]. However, it should be emphasized that this is the only
axiom that requires adjusting to extend the results of this section to inﬁnite trees.
241. ¼ satisﬁes Axioms 3.8, 3.10 and 3.9; furthermore, for all non-null E ∈Σ and all f , f 0 ∈ FE, f ¼E f 0 if
and only if f ¼∗
E,g f 0 for some (hence all) g ∈TE.
2. For every non-null E ∈Σ, ¼E is complete and transitive, and satisﬁes Axioms 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7.
This result can be interpreted as follows. If a given unconditional preference satisﬁes the above
“structure” axioms, and conditional preferences are deﬁned from it as in Def. 13, then the resulting sys-
tem of conditional preferences satisﬁes the “linkage” axioms. Conversely, if one assumes that the DM
is characterized by a system of conditional preferences that satisfy the above “linkage” axioms, one can
elicit these preferences via Def. 13; furthermore, it will also be the case that the DM’s unconditional
preference satisﬁes the “structure” axioms.
Theorem 2 mirrors a similar statement that applies to Savage’s updating rule for preferences over
acts. In that setting, if prior preferences satisfy the Sure-Thing Principle (a “structure” axiom), then con-
ditional preferences deﬁned via Savage’s updating rule satisfy Dynamic Consistency and Relevance (the
“linkage” axioms; Relevance requires that the DM be conditionally indifferent between any two acts that
agree on the conditioning event). Conversely, if the “linkage” axioms of Dynamic Consistency and Rele-
vancehold, conditionalpreferencescanbeelicitedfrompriorpreferencesviaSavage’srule; furthermore,
prior preferences satisfy the “structural” Sure-Thing axiom. See Ghirardato [11].
4 Examples and Extensions
4.1 Consistent Planning for MEU preferences and Full Bayesian Updating
AsnotedintheIntroduction,amainobjectiveofthepresentpaperistoshowthatsophisticateddynamic
choice can be guaranteed for any choice of preference model and updating rule, regardless of whether
or not the latter yields dynamically consistent preferences over Savage acts.
This subsection shows how to apply the proposed approach to the MEU decision model (Gilboa
and Schmeidler [12]) and prior-by-prior, or “full” Bayesian updating. While this is not the only possible
updating rule for MEU preferences (see the next subsection for examples and references), it has received
considerable attention in the literature. As will be clear, it is straightforward to adapt the analysis in
this subsection to different representations of preferences (e.g. Choquet-expected utility) and different
updating rules (e.g. the Dempster-Shafer rule).
I begin by formalizing the assumption that preferences are consistent with MEU. As a preliminary
step, recall that a tree f ∈ FE is a plan iff, for every h ∈ FE, C f (h) is a singleton. This immediately implies
that every state ω determines a unique path through the tree f : formally, for every ω ∈ E, there is a
unique h ∈ f ∩TE such that ω ∈ E(h). Throughout this subsection, for every plan f ∈ FE and ω ∈ E, the
notation f (ω) indicates the prize ξ(h), where h is the unique terminal history of f with ω∈ E(h).
25The required assumption on preferences can now be stated.
Assumption 4.1 (Non-trivial MEU with reduction) Thereexistsaweak*–closed,convexsetC ofﬁnitely-
additive probabilities on (Ω,Σ) and a continuous function u :X →R such that, for all plans f ,g ∈ FΩ,









Moreover, there exist plans f ,g ∈ FΩ such that f  g.
If prior preferences satisfy Assumption 4.1 and the event E is not null (cf. Def. 11), then, according
to prior-by-prior Bayesian updating, conditional preferences ¼E over plans are deﬁned stipulating that,
for all plans f ,g ∈ FE,









Thus, one can adapt Def. 9 to obtain a version of Consistent Planning speciﬁc to MEU preferences
and prior-by-prior updating; the details are as follows. Consider a tree f ∈ FE. For every terminal history
h ∈ f ∩TE, let CPMEUf (h) = {f (h)}. Inductively, if h ∈ f ∩HE and CPMEUf (h0) has been deﬁned for all




p ∈ FE(h) : ∃c ∈C f (h) s.t. Cp(;)={c}, Fp(;,c)=Ff (h,c) and



















where u and C are as in Assumption 4.1. In the next subsection, this algorithm will be used to analyze a
model of information acquisition.
Prior-by-prior Bayesian updating can be characterized via axioms on conditional preferences over
acts; see e.g. Jaffray [20] and Pires [33].22 It will now be shown that a version of the main axiom in Pires
[33] and Siniscalchi [38], augmented with the axioms in Sec. 3.1.1, yields a characterization of consistent
planning for MEU preferences and full Bayesian updating. This may be viewed as a specialization of
Theorem 1, just like the deﬁnition of CPMEUf (·) specializes Def. 9.
To ﬁx ideas, it is useful to consider the standard Dynamic Consistency axiom as a starting point:
22Siniscalchi [39] characterizes prior-by-prior updating for a broad class of preferences. Also, although it is not explicitly
decision-theoretic, the earliest characterization is probably due to Walley [42].
26Axiom 4.1 (Dynamic Consistency) For all non-null E ∈Σ, all g ∈TE, and all plans f , f 0 ∈ FE:
f ¼E f 0 ⇐⇒ fEg ¼ f 0
Eg.
The key axiom characterizing prior-by-prior updating has a much narrower scope:
Axiom 4.2 (Constant-Act Dynamic Consistency) For all non-null E ∈ Σ, all plans f ∈ FE and x ∈ X: if
g ∈TE, Cg(;)={a}, Fg(;,a)={E,Ω\E} and [a,Ω\E,x]∈ g, then
f ¼E x ⇐⇒ fEg ¼xEg.
Axiom 4.2 differs from Axiom 4.1 in two important respects. First, Axiom 4.2 only considers condi-
tional comparisons between a tree f and a prize x, whereas Axiom 4.2 has implications whenever two
arbitrary trees f and f 0 are compared conditional on an essential event E. Second, the E-test trees g
considered in Axiom 4.2 g are rather special: following the (unique) initial action a, the individual can
observe either the event E or the event Ω\E; in the latter case, she receives the prizex.23 Thus, in partic-
ular, the tree xEg is a plan, and by Assumption 4.1 the DM deems it equivalent to the prize x itself.24 No
suchrestrictionisimposedontesttreesinAxiom4.1. Themotivationsfortheserestrictionsarediscussed
in the sources cited above (see especially [33] and [38]).
The counterpart to Theorem 1 can then be stated.
Theorem 3 Consider a system of preferences {¼E};6=E∈Σ that satisﬁes Assumption 2.1. Suppose that As-
sumption 4.1 holds, and that every event E ∈ Σ \ {;} is non-null. Then the following statements are
equivalent.
1. For every E ∈ Σ\{;}, ¼E is complete and transitive on all of FE; furthermore, Axioms 3.1, 3.2, 3.3
and 4.2 hold;
2. for any E ∈ Σ \ {;} and every pair of trees f ,g ∈ FE: f ¼E g if and only if p ¼E q for some p ∈
CPMEUf (;) and q ∈CPMEUg(;).
4.2 Sophistication and the Value of Information
This subsection analyzes a simple model of information acquisition. This example provides an applica-
tion of the analytic framework proposed in this paper. From a substantive point of view, it highlights a
basic trade-off between information acquisition and commitment.
23Formally, there are many such test trees; these only differ in the label attached to the initial action, and in the (irrelevant)
continuation trees speciﬁed after E occurs.
24The reader may wonder why the axiom was not stated in the simpler form: for all f ∈ FE and x ∈ X, “f ¼E x if and only if
f Ex ¼ x”. The problem is that “f Ex” would need a separate deﬁnition: recall that the prize x is identiﬁed with the tree {;,[x]},
which is, formally, not an E-test tree, and therefore does not allow one to invoke the notation in Def. 10.
274.2.1 A Parametric Information-Acquisition Model
Consider an individual facing a choice between two alternative actions, a and b. Uncertainty is repre-
sented by a state space Ω = Ω1 × Ω2, where Ω1 = Ω2 = {α,β}. The individual receives H dollars if she
chooses action a and the second coordinate of the prevailing state is α, or if she chooses action b and
the second coordinate of the prevailing state is β; othewise, she receives L < H dollars. Finally, prior to
choosing an action, the individual observes the ﬁrst coordinate of the prevailing state.
Thus, at any state (ω1,ω2), payoffs are determined by ω2, which the individual does not observe;
however, she does observe the signal ω1.
Assume that the individual reduces plans to acts, has MEU preferences over acts, and linear utility
over monetary prizes. Beliefs are represented by the set of priors C = {αP +(1−α)Q : α ∈ [0,1]}, where
P,Q ∈∆(Ω) are deﬁned in Table 3.
Prior (α,α) (α,β) (β,α) (β,β)
P 1−2" " " 0
Q 0 " " 1−2"













, and should be thought of as being “small”. In other words,
this individual believes that the signal (ω1) is most likely equal to the payoff-relevant component of the
state (ω2), but the relative likelihood of ω2 = α vs. ω2 = β is ambiguous; furthermore, she assigns a
(small and unambiguous) probability " to each state where the signal is “wrong” (i.e. different from the
payoff-relevant component).
Finally, assume that the individual updates her beliefs prior-by-prior. The set C does not satisfy the
“rectangularity” condition of Epstein and Schneider [9] with respect to the ﬁltration corresponding to
the information-acquisition problem under consideration; thus, dynamic consistency does not hold.25
The objective is to determine the value of the information conveyed by the signal ω1. However, since
preferencesaredynamicallyinconsistent, itiscrucialtospecifywhetherornottheindividualcancommit
to speciﬁc actions contingent upon the realization of the signal ω1.
If the individual can commit,thensheeffectivelyfacesachoiceamongfourplans,denotedpaa,pab,pba
and pbb: for instance, pab is the plan that prescribes the choice a after seeing ω1 = α and the choice b
after observing ω1 =β. Table 4 indicates the prize delivered by each of these plans in every state, as well
as their MEU evaluation (assuming Reduction).
25For completeness, the relevant ﬁltration is F0,F1, where F0 ={Ω} and F1 ={{(α,α),(α,β)},{(β,α),(β,β)}}.
28Plan (α,α) (α,β) (β,α) (β,β) MEU
paa H L H L (1−")L +"H
pbb L H L H (1−")L +"H
pab H L L H 2"L +(1−2")H
pba L H H L (1−2")L +2"H
Table 4: Plans under full commitment.
Since 0<" <
1
4, the individual’s ranking of the four plans in Table 4 is
pab pba paa ∼pbb.
Furthermore, note that, if the individual does not acquire information, her feasible chocies are the two
acts corresponding to paa and pbb respectively: thus, the value of the signal ω1 under commitment is
(1−3")(H −L).
If the individual cannot commit,thentheindividual’sdynamic-choiceproblemisrepresentedbythe
















Figure 6: The tree f (value of information without commitment).
If the individual is sophisticated,27 Theorem 1 implies that she deems f equivalent to its Consistent-
Planning solution—which, as will be seen momentarily, is unique in this problem. To compute it, note
26As a matter of notation, one must label the sole (dummy) initial action; the symbol “∗” is used here.
27Weak Commitment is not required in this particular problem.
29that the set of posteriors given each realization of the signal ω1 is obtained by updating P and Q, then
taking the convex hull of the resulting probabilities. These posteriors are given by Table 5.
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Table 5: The individual’s posterior beliefs given ω1 =α (left) and ω1 =β (right).
It is immediate to see that the DM will choose b after observing ω1 = α and a after observing ω1 = β.
To understand the motivation for these choices, consider for deﬁniteness the case ω1 = α. A priori, the
individual believes that ω1 equals ω2 with high probability, but she also feels that the relative likelihood
of ω2 = α vs. ω2 = β is highly ambiguous. On the other hand, she assigns a small, but positive and
unambiguous prior probability " to the event that the signal ω1 is actually wrong. When contemplating
the choice of a after seeing ω1 = α, the latter consideration looms large: the individual is convinced
that the signal might be wrong, whereas, for all she knows, the event ω2 = α may actually be extremely
unlikely. Thus, this ambiguity-averse individual perceives a as a more “dangerous” choice than b. A
similar argument applies to the case ω1 =β.
Summing up, pba is the unique Consistent-Planning solution of the tree f . From Table 4, the value






, it follows that the value
of information is positive, but smaller than in the commitment case.
4.2.2 Value of Information and Value of Commitment
The above example suggests that acquiring information has two consequences for sophisticated but
(possibly) dynamically inconsistent decision-makers. On one hand, information potentially leads to
more ﬁne-grained decisions; in this sense, it is “intrinsically” beneﬁcial, regardless of ambiguity atti-
tudes or other features of preferences. On the other hand, the actual choices made contingent upon the
realization of a signal may fail to be optimal from the ex-ante point of view. Conversely, not acquiring
information entails a cost (coarser decisions), but also yields a beneﬁt—partial commmitment.
In the example, without acquiring any information, the feasible set of plans available to the indi-
vidual is (up to Reduction) {paa,pbb}. If the DM acquires information and can commit, then the set of
feasible plans is {paa,pab,pba,pbb}. Finally, if she acquires information but cannot commit, then the
feasible set only consists of the plans she will actually follow, i.e. CPf (;)={pba}. The fact that both infor-
mationandcommitmentareintrinsicallyvaluableissimplyaconsequenceofthefactthatthe{paa,pbb}
and CPf (;) are both subsets of {paa,pab,pba,pbb}. Similarly, the fact that CPf (;) and {paa,pbb} are not
ordered by inclusion indicates that, in general, it may or may not be beneﬁcial for the individual to ac-
30quire information. For the preferences considered here, information is valuable; however, the example
can be modiﬁed so that not acquiring information is optimal; see also Epstein and Le Breton [8].
Thedecisionwhetherornottoacquireasignal(andwhatpricetopayforit)isthusdrivenbyatrade-
off between the intrinsic value of information and the value of commitment; this trade-off is captured by
Consistent Planning. In particular, if the commitment problem is severe enough, the DM may rationally
choose to pay a price so as to avoid making choices after observing the realization of a particular signal,
despite the fact that information is intrinsically valuable. Similar patterns of behavior emerges in other
related contexts featuring time-inconsistent but sophisticated decision-makers: see e.g. Carrillo and
Mariotti [3] and references therein.
The framework proposed in this paper allows a straightforward formalization of these observations
in a general setting: see Section B.1 in the Online Appendix for details.
4.3 Consistent Planning for Simple Inﬁnite Trees
In the context of time-inconsistent choice under conditions of certainty, it is well-known (e.g. Peleg
and Yaari [32]; Gul and Pesendorfer [15]) that consistent-planning solutions may fail to exist for certain
inﬁnitedecisiontrees. Similarsituationscanariseinthepresentsettingaswell. Thissubsectionprovides
an example, and uses it to motivate an extension of the axioms in Sec. 3.1.1 that addresses this issue for
















Figure 7: The subtree f (;,a) corresponding to action a ∈[0,1].
Let Ω = {α,β,γ,δ} and X = R; consider a tree f such that C f (;) = [0,1] and, for every a ∈ [0,1], the
continuation tree f (;,a) corresponding to the choice of a is as depicted in Fig. 7. Assume that the DM








Finally, assume that the DM adopts the prior-by-prior Bayesian updating rule.
Consider the last (i.e. rightmost) decision history. With these assumptions, the minimum expected
payoffs conditional on {α,β} are −a for t and 0 for b, the DM will strictly prefer b if a > 0, and will be
indifferent between t and b if a =0.
Next, consider the middle decision node. Action s is expected to yield 4 regardless of the value of a,
whereas c is expected to yield 0 if a > 0 (because c will be followed with b) and, by Weak Commitment
and Sophistication, 5 if a =0 (because she can commit to t at the last decision history). Therefore, at the
middle decision node, the individual will choose s if a >0 and c if a =0.
Now consider the point of view of the DM when she is at initial node and chooses a ∈ [0,1]. If a > 0,
then she expects to continue with s at the middle node, so the tree f (;,a) evaluates to 10 − a ≥ 9. If
instead a = 0, then she expects to continue with c and t, which she evaluates at 5. It is then clear
that there is no a ∈ [0,1] that maximizes the DM’s ex-ante minimum expected payoffs. Consequently,
applying Def. 9 yields an empty set of “consistent-planning solutions” for the tree f .
Observe that the DM effectively faces a “non-compact” set of alternative continuation plans at the
initial history.28 This is mainly due to the speciﬁc tie-breaking rule implicit in consistent planning; in-
troducing some ﬂexibility in the tie-breaking rule resolves the issue. The “multi-selves” approach, which
is common in the literature on time-inconsistent preferences under certainty (see e.g. Peleg and Yaari
[32]), provides a way to formalize this notion of ﬂexibility.29
However, there is an alternative resolution to the difﬁculties highlighted here: namely, maintain the
tie-breaking assumption embodied in the Weak Commitment axiom, but strengthen Sophistication so as
to specify how the DM evaluates non-compact sets of continuation plans.
In the example, the DM cannot achieve an expected payoff of exactly 10; however, she can approx-
imate it by choosing a positive but small. In light of this observation, it does not seem unreasonable
to assume that the DM will evaluate the tree f to be worth 10 payoff units. For instance, she will strictly
prefer the tree f to any constant prize smaller than 10. More generally, one can assume that a collection
of continuation plans is evaluated according to the “supremum”, not the “maximum” of expected payoffs.
It is easy to modify the deﬁnition of consistent planning to reﬂect this assumption. Refer to Def. 9;
28The relevant topological notions are made precise in §B.2 of the Web Appendix. In the example, it is sufﬁcient to identify
plans with acts, i.e. payoff vectors in R4; in this case, the preceding analysis makes it clear that the set of feasible payoff vectors
is not compact.
29Harris [19] shows that subgame-perfect equilibria exist for a broad class of “regular” inﬁnite games; his analysis can be
adapted to the present setting as well.
32once a suitable topology on the set of plans has been introduced, the set CPf (h) can be redeﬁned to be
the collection of ¼E(h)–best elements in the closure of CP0
f (h).
A characterization of this modiﬁed deﬁnition analogous to Theorem 1 can be obtained by suitably
strengthening the axioms in Sec. 3.1.1. This requires some care, but the basic idea is simple. Recall
that Sophistication requires that, whenever a set B of actions at a history h of a tree f dominates every
other action at h, then f is deemed equivalent to a tree where the actions not in B are pruned. The
strengthened Sophistication axiom instead requires that f be equivalent to a modiﬁed tree f 0 where
the continuation plans available at h are, loosely speaking, the closure of the set of continuation plans
corresponding to actions in B.30
The precise statement of the axioms, algorithmic procedure, and characterization result, can be
found in §B.2 of the Web Appendix. The remainder of this subsection focuses on the interpretation of
the assumptions implicit in this approach.
As noted in the Introduction, Consistent Planning can be seen as a way to extend a collection of
preferencesoverplans topreferencesovermoregeneraltrees. Itshouldbeclearfromtheabove, informal
discussion that the proposed approach achieves this objective for simple inﬁnite trees.
Itisalsoworthemphasizingthatthisapproachdoesnotentailanydeparturefromthefullydecision-
theoretic point of view maintained throughout this paper. There are two aspects to this claim. First,
to the extent that one can construct actual choice experiments featuring inﬁnitely many alternatives,
the strengthened axioms are testable; they reﬂect aspects of the DM’s behavior. Second, the modiﬁed
consistent-planning algorithm is simply a description of a speciﬁc individual’s preferences, so there is
no ambiguity as to the interpretation of welfare statements. By way of contrast, welfare analysis presents
methodological difﬁculties in the multi-selves approach: see especially Gul and Pesendorfer [14, §6.4].
Oneﬁnalissuewarrantsfurtherdiscussion. Againrefertotheaboveexample. Theproposedassump-
tion is that the DM deem the tree f to be worth 10 units, the “supremum” of the expected continuation
payoffs she can actually secure in f . This assumption pertains to the DM’s evaluation of a (non-compact)
set of feasible continuation plans, not to the DM’s beliefs about her future choices. In particular, the DM
does not expect to be able to commit to s at the second decision point if she chooses a =0.
Thiscanbeseenbyapplyingthemodiﬁedaxiomstothetree f . Followingtheargumentsgivenabove,
the tree is ﬁrst pruned so that each initial action a > 0 leads to a choice of s, and the initial action a = 0
leads to c followed by t. The modiﬁed Sophistication axiom now implies that the resulting pruned tree is
deemed equivalent to an expanded tree that includes a new initial action, say “0∗”, corresponding to the
plan in f characterized by the choices a = 0 and s. Thus, if the DM chooses the “real” action a = 0, she
still expects this to be followed by c and t. The assumption adopted here is simply that she evaluates the
30Other changes to the axioms are necessary to handle inﬁnite trees; however, these changes are not related to consistent
planning per se, and are largely of a notational and technical nature.
33tree f “as if” the ﬁctitious action a =0∗ was also available.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 (Consistent Planning)
A.1.1 Preliminaries
First,forcompleteness,Ishowthattherelabelingrelation≈isanequivalence. Reﬂexivityandtransitivity
of ≈ are immediate. For symmetry, suppose that f ≈ g and let ϕ be as in Def. 3. To show that also g ≈ f ,
note ﬁrst that ϕ−1 satisﬁes properties (i), (ii) and (iv) in the Deﬁnition. For (iii), I prove the following
remark, which will also be used in the proof of Lemma 4 below.
Remark A.1 Consider f ,g ∈ FE such that f ≈ g, and let ϕ be as in Def. 3. Then, for all h0 ∈ g, a0 ∈Cg(h0),
and D,D0 ∈Fg(h0,a0), a(ϕ−1([h0,a0,D]))=a(ϕ−1([h0,a0,D0])).
Proof: If Cg(h0) = ;, so h0 ∈ TE, then by (i) in Def. 3 also ϕ−1(h0) ∈ TE; similarly, if x ∈ Cg(h0)∩X, then
Fg(h0,x) = ;, so [h0,x] ∈ TE and thus ϕ−1([h0,x]) ∈ TE as well: in turn, this implies that Ff ([h,x]) = ;.
Thus, the claim is trivially true in these cases.
Assume now that a0 ∈ Cg(h0) ∩ A, and consider D,D0 ∈ Fg(h0,a0). Suppose by contradiction that
a = a(ϕ−1([h0,a0,D])) 6=b = a(ϕ−1([h0,a0,D0])), so in particular D 6= D0, and let h = ϕ−1(h0). Then a,b ∈
C f (h); since ϕ satisﬁes (iii) by assumption, for any G ∈ Ff (h,a), a(ϕ([h,a,G])) = a(ϕ([h,a,D])) = a0,
and similarly, for any G ∈ Ff (h,b), a(ϕ([h,b,G]) = a(ϕ([h,b,D0])) = a0. This implies that Fg(h0,a0) ⊃
Ff (h,a)∪Ff (h,b). Since Fg(h0,a0),Ff (h,a),Ff (h,b) are all partitions of E(h0)= E(h), this implies that
they are all equal. In particular, D0 ∈ Ff (h,a): but then ϕ([h,a,D0]) = [h0,a0,D0] = ϕ([h,b,D0]), which
contradicts the fact that ϕ is one-to-one.
Next, the following straightforward result on relabelings that will be used several times below. (This
Lemmaalsosuggestsanalternative,inductivecharacterizationofrelabelingbasedonbijectionsbetween
sets of choices available at different histories; such a characterization would be possibly more explicit,
but also more involved, than Def. 3).
Lemma 4 Consider E ∈Σ\; and f ,g ∈ FE. Then f ≈ g if and only if there is a bijection γ:C f (;)→Cg(;)
such that, for all c ∈C f (;),
(i) c ∈X implies γ(c)=c, and
(ii) c ∈A implies Ff (;,c)=Fg(;,γ(c)) and, for all D ∈Ff (;,c), f ([c,D])≈ g([γ(c),D]).
34Proof: (If): for each a ∈ C f (;) ∩ A and D ∈ Ff (;,a), let ϕ[a,D] be the bijection satisfying (i)–(iv) in
Def. 3 for f ([a,D]) and g([α(a),D]). Deﬁne ϕ : f → g as follows: ﬁrst, let ϕ(;) = ; and ϕ([x]) = [x]
for every x ∈ C f (;) ∩ X; then, for any history h = (a1,E1,...,aT,ET) ∈ f ∩ HE with T ≥ 1, let ϕ(h) =
[γ(a1),E1,ϕ[a1,E1]([a2,E2,...,aT,ET]);31 similarly, for any history h = (a1,E1,...,aT−1,ET−1,x) ∈ f ∩TE
with T ≥ 2, let ϕ(h) = [γ(a1),E1,ϕ[a1,E1]([a2,E2,...,aT−1,ET−1,x]). It is now routine to verify that, since
the bijections ϕ[a,D] satisfy (i)–(iv) in Def. 3, ϕ is a bijection that also satisﬁes the same properties.
(Only if): let ϕ : f → g be the bijection in Def. 3 for f and g, and let γ : C f (;) → Cg(;) be such that,
for all c ∈C f (;), if c ∈A and D ∈Ff (;,a), then ϕ([c,D])=[γ(c),D] (the fact that E(ϕ([a,D]))=D follows
from (ii) in Def. 3); and if c ∈ X, then ϕ([c]) = [γ(c)], so γ(c) = c (recall that ϕ([c]) must have length 1,
be terminal, and satisfy ξ(ϕ([c])) = ξ([c]) = c). Then γ is well-deﬁned on C f (;)∩A: if [a,D],[a,D0] ∈ f ,
then D,D0 ∈ Ff (;,a), and (iii) in Def. 3 ensures that a(ϕ([a,D])) = a(ϕ([a,D0]); it is also trivially well-
deﬁned on C f (; ∩ X). Also, consider c0 ∈ Cg(;): if c0 ∈ X, then [c0] ∈ g ∩ TE, so ϕ−1([c0]) is terminal
in f and has length 1, which implies that c0 ∈ C f (;). If instead c0 ∈ A, then there is D ∈ Σ such that
[a0,D] ∈ g, and since ϕ is onto, there exists a ∈ C f (;) such that ϕ([a,D]) = [a0,D]; this shows that γ is
onto. Similarly, consider c,c0 ∈C f (;). If c ∈ A and c0 ∈ X, clearly γ(c) 6= γ(c0). If c,c0 ∈ X and c 6= c0, then
γ(c)=c 6=c0 =γ(c0). Finally, consider the case c,c0 ∈A, so there are D,D0 ∈Σ such that [c,D],[c0,D0]∈ f .
Suppose γ(c)=γ(c0)=a0: then a(ϕ([c,D]))=a(ϕ([c0,D0]))=a0, which implies that D,D0 ∈Fg(;,a0). But
then Remark A.1 implies that c = a(ϕ−1([a0,D])) = a(ϕ−1([a0,D0])) = c0; thus, γ is one-to-one. It is now
routine to verify that the bijection γ satisﬁes properties (i) and (ii) in the above claim.
Corollary 5 Assume further that f ,g ∈ FE are such that C f (;)={c} and Cg(;)={c0}. Then:
(i) If c ∈X, then f ≈ g iff f = g;
(ii) if c ∈A, then f ≈ g iff Ff (;,c)=Fg(;,c0) and, for all D ∈Ff (;,c), f ([c,D])≈ g([c0,D]).
It is also useful to extend the notion of “equivalence up to relabeling” from individual trees to sets of
trees. Let E ∈ Σ and consider G,G0 ⊂ FE. Then G ≈ G0 means that there is a bijection ψ : G → G0 such
that, for every g ∈ F, g ≈ψ(g). The following corollary to Lemma 4 then follows easily:
Corollary 6 Consider E ∈Σ\{;} and f ,g ∈ FE. Then f ≈ g iff the set {f (;,c):c ∈C f (;)} is a relabeling of
{g(;,c0):c0 ∈Cg(;)}.
Proof: (If) : let ψ the bijection between the two sets of continuation trees. Deﬁne γ : C f (;) → Cg(;) by
γ(c)=c0 iff ψ(f (;,c))= g(;,c0). The claim now follows from Corollary 5.
31In particular, ϕ([a,D])=[γ(a),D,ϕ[a,D](;)=[γ(a),D]) for suitable a and D.
35(Only If): let γ be the bijection in Lemma 4 and deﬁne ψ(f (;,c)) = g(;,γ(c)). It is now easy to verify
that ψ has the required properties.
Finally, the deﬁnition of Consistent Planning (Def. 9) can be augmented with an explicit iterative
structure. Fix a tree f ∈ FE. A feasible sequence for the Consistent-Planning algorithm is an ordering
h1,...,hN of the non-terminal histories of f such that, for all n,m ∈ {1,...,N}, n < m implies not hn ≤
hm; that is, either hn and hm are not ordered (neither one follows the other), or hn follows hm. Clearly,
in every feasible sequence, hN =;.
Corresponding to h1,...,hN, one can construct a sequence of trees f 1,..., f N+1 ∈ FE as follows. First,
let f 1 = f ; then, for all n = 1,...,N, let f n+1 = (g n)hn f n, where the tree g n is such that {g n(;,c) : c ∈
Cg n(;)}≈CPf (hn). Observe that, in this construction, C f n(hn)=C f (hn) for every n =1,...,N.
The assumption that A is countably inﬁnite ensures that this construction is always possible: in par-
ticular, in the deﬁnition of the tree g n at step n, one can always ﬁnd as many distinct action labels as
there are plans in CPf (hn).
A.1.2 Sufﬁciency
Assume ﬁrst that (i) in Theorem 1 holds, and let f 1,..., f N+1 be the sequence of trees corresponding to
the feasible sequence h1,...,hN. It will be shown that, for all n =1,...,N, f n ∼E f n+1.
Claim 1: Fix n ∈{1,...,N} and consider the history hn. Then:
(a) for every action a ∈C f n(hn)∩A and event D ∈Ff n(hn,a),
{f n([hn,a,D],c):c ∈C f n([hn,a,D])}≈CPf ([hn,a,D]);
(b) for every prize x ∈C f n(hn)∩X, CPf ([hn,x])={f n(hn,x)} and f n(hn,x)= f (hn,x)={;,[x]}.
Proof: Note that, for every action a and event D as in (a), [hn,a,D]=hm for some index m <n; now, for
all ` ∈ {m +1,...,n −1}, hm 6≤ h`, and clearly it is also note the case that hm > h` > hn; this implies that
f n(hm)= f m+1(hm)= g m [that is, no further modiﬁcation of the tree at histories weakly following hm =
[hn,a,D] has occurred after step m]. Thus, by construction, {f n([hn,a,D],c) : c ∈ C f n([hn,a,D])} =
{g m(;,c):c ∈Cg m(;)}≈CPf ([hn,a,D]) by the deﬁnition of g m.
If instead x is as in (b), then x ∈ C f (hn) = C f n(hn), so by the relevant deﬁnitions CPf ([hn,c]) =
{f (hn,x)} and f (hn,x) = {;,[x]}; furthermore, clearly, for m = 1,...,n −1, [hn,x] 6≤ hm, which implies
that f n([hn,x])= f ([hn,x]), as needed.
Claim 2. Consider a tree g n
0 ∈ FE(hn) such that {g n
0 (;,c) : c ∈Cg n
0 (;)} ≈ CP0
f (hn). Then g n
0 is a one-period
commitment version of f n(hn).
36Proof: Let ¯ g be a tree that allows one-period commitment in f n(hn). Note ﬁrst that, by Def. 7, ¯ g must
be a plan, because the tree f n is such that every choice at histories following hn corresponds to a plan.
Denote the unique choice in C ¯ g(;) by c. If c ∈ X, so ¯ g = {;,[x]}, then c ∈ C f n(hn) = C f (hn), and so by
deﬁnition ¯ g ∈ CP0
f (hn): this implies that also c ∈ Cg n
0 (;), i.e. g n
0 (;,c) = ¯ g. If instead c ∈ A, consider
an arbitrary D ∈ F ¯ g(;,c). Again by Def. 7, ¯ g([c,D]) = f n(hn)([c,D],b[c,D]) = f n([hn,c,D],b[c,D]) for
some b[c,D] ∈C f n([hn,c,D]); therefore, Claim 1 implies that there exists a unique p[c,D] ∈ CPf ([hn,c,D])
such that ¯ g([c,D]) ≈ p[c,D]. Now consider the (unique) plan p ∈ FE(hn) such that Cp(;) = {c}, Fp(;,c) =
F ¯ g(;,c) = Ff (hn,c), and for all D ∈ Fp(;,c), p([c,D]) = p[c,D]. Clearly, p ∈ CP0
f (hn); since {g n
0 (;,c) : c ∈
Cg n
0 (;)} ≈ CP0
f (hn), there exists a unique ¯ c ∈ Cg n
0 (;) such that g n
0 (;, ¯ c) ≈ p. Furthermore, by Lemma 4,
p ≈ ¯ g; hence, as required, there is a unique action ¯ c ∈Cg n
0 (;) such that g n
0 (;, ¯ c)≈ ¯ g.
Conversely, ﬁx ¯ c ∈Cg n
0 (;). By assumption there is a (unique) plan p ∈CP0
f (hn) such that g n
0 (;, ¯ c)≈p.
If ¯ c ∈ X, then g n
0 (;, ¯ c) = p = {;,[¯ c]} and, by Def. 9, ¯ c ∈ C f (hn) = C f n(hn): this implies that, triv-
ially, g n
0 (;,c) allows one-period commitment in f n(hn). If instead ¯ c ∈ A, then by Def. 9, there is c ∈
C f (hn) = C f n(hn) such that Cp(;) = {c}, Fp(;,c) = Ff (hn,c) = Ff n(hn,c), and furthermore, for every
D ∈Fp(;,c),p([c,D])∈CPf ([hn,c,D]). Claim1impliesthatthereexistsa(unique)b[c,D] ∈C f n([hn,c,D])
such that p([c,D]) ≈ f n([hn,c,D],b[c,D]). Thus, consider the plan ¯ g ⊂ f n(hn) such that C ¯ g(;) = {c},
F ¯ g(;,c)=Ff n(hn,c), and for all D ∈F ¯ g(;,c), g([c,D])= f n([hn,c,D],b[c,D]). By Lemma 4, p ≈ ¯ g, hence
g n
0 (;, ¯ c)≈ ¯ g, and furthermore ¯ g allows one-period commitment in f n(hn), as needed.
Claim 3. For all n =1,...,N, f n ∼E f n+1.
Proof: Consider g n
0 as in Claim 2. The latter asserts that g n
0 is a one-period commitment version of
f n(hn). Furthermore, if hm immediately follows hn, then m < n and f n(hm) = g m; consider c,c0 ∈
C f n(hm);byconstruction,thereexistp,p0 ∈CPf (hm)suchthat f n(hm,c)= g m(;,c)≈p and f n(hm,c0)=






hn f n ∼E f n. Now consider the set of ¼E(hn)–best actions at the initial history of g n
0 , i.e. Cn =
{c ∈ Cg n
0 (;) : ∀c0 ∈ Cg n
0 (;),g n
0 (;,c) ¼E(hn) g n





hn f n ∼E
(g n
0 )hn f n.
I claim that g n
0 (;,Cn) is a relabeling of g n. To prove this, by Corollary 6 it is enough to show that
{g n
0 (;,c) : c ∈Cn} ≈ CPf (hn), as CPf (hn) ≈ {g n(;,c) : c ∈Cg n(;)} by construction. Thus, consider c ∈Cn,
and let p ∈CP0
f (hn) be the unique plan in the latter set such that g n
0 (;,c)≈p. Now consider an arbitrary
p0 ∈ CP0
f (hn) and let c0 ∈ Cg n
0 (;) be such that g n
0 (;,c0) ≈ p0. Then g n
0 (;,c) ¼E(hn) g n
0 (;,c0); by Relabeling
Invariance, this implies that p ¼E(hn) p0. Thus, p ∈ CPf (hn). Conversely, pick p ∈ CPf (hn) ⊂ CP0
f (hn),
and let c ∈ Cg n
0 (;) be such that p ≈ g n
0 (;,c). Consider an arbitrary c0 ∈ Cg n
0 (;), and let p0 ∈ CP0
f (hn) be
such that g n
0 (;,c0) ≈ p0. Then, by the deﬁnition of CPf (hn), p ¼E(hn) p0, so by Relabeling Invariance also
g n
0 (;,c)¼E(hn) g n
0 (;,c0). Thus, c ∈Cn.
37Finally, g n





hn f n ≈ (g n)hn f n = f n+1. Thus, by Relabel-





hn f n ∼E (g n)hn f n = f n+1, as required.
The proof of sufﬁciency can now be completed. Observe that f = f 1 ∼E f N+1 by transitivity; fur-
thermore, {f N+1(;,c) : c ∈ C f N+1(;)} ≈ CPf (;), so for all c,c0 ∈ C f N+1(;), f N+1(;,c) ∼E f N+1(;,c0): thus,
Simpliﬁcation implies f N+1(;,c) ∼E f for all c ∈C f N+1(;). Now consider g ∈ FE such that g ≈ p for some
p ∈ CPf (;): by construction, there is some cp ∈ C f N+1(;) such that p ≈ f N+1(;,cp); by transitivity of the
relabeling relation, g ≈ f N+1(;,cp). Now, by Relabeling Invariance, g ∼E f N+1(;,cp)∼E f , as required.
A.1.3 Necessity
First of all, observe that Def. 9 immediately implies that, for every tree f and every history h of f ,
CPf (h)=CPf (h)(;). The following property of Consistent Planning is also easy to establish.
Lemma 7 Let f ,g ∈ FE be such that f ≈ g. Then CP0
f (;)≈CP0
g(;) and CPf (;)≈CPg(;).
Proof: The argument is by induction on the maximum length of histories in f (hence, also in g). If f
and g are constant trees (so the maximum length is one), the claim is immediate from Corollary 5. Thus,
suppose that the claim is true for trees of maximum history length n, and assume that f and g have
maximum history length equal to n +1. Let ϕ : f → g be the bijection in Def. 3. Lemma 4 implies that,
for every a ∈C f (;)∩A and D ∈ Ff (;,a), f ([a,D]) ≈ g(ϕ([a,D])); by the induction hypothesis, the claim
is true for these two (sub)trees, so CPf ([a,D]) = CPf ([a,D])(;) ≈ CPg([a,D])(;) = CPg([a,D]). Moreover, for
every x ∈C f (;)∩X, ϕ([x])=[x].
It is clear that, if {;,[x]} ∈ CP0
f (;), then x ∈ C f (;), and so also also {;,[x]} ∈ CP0
g(;). Next, suppose
p ∈ CP0
f (;) is such that Cp(;) = {a} for some a ∈ A. Let γ : C f (;) → Cg(;) be the bijection in Lemma
4. For every D ∈ Fp(;,a) = Ff (;,a), p([a,D]) ∈ CPf ([a,D]), and by the preceding argument there is
q[a,D] ∈ CPg(ϕ([a,D])) such that p([a,D]) ≈ q[a,D]. Hence, there is q ∈ CP0
g(;) such that Cq(;) = {γ(a)}
and, for all D ∈Fq(;,γ(a))=Fg(;,γ(a)), q([γ(a),D])=q[a,D]. By Lemma 4, p ≈q.
Furthermore, suppose p,p0 ∈ CP0
f (;), with p 6= p0. If Cp(;) 6= Cp0(;), or if Cp(;) = Cp0(;) = {a} and
Fp(;,a) 6= Fp0(;,a), the preceding construction associates distinct elements of CP0
g(;) to p and p0. Oth-
erwise, there must be a ∈ A and D ∈ Fp(;,a) = Fp0(;,a) such that p([a,D]) 6= p0([a,D]). The induction
hypothesis implies that p([a,D]) and p0([a,D]) map to different elements of CPg([γ(a),D]), so it follows
that p and p0 are mapped to different elements of CP0
g(;).
32Let ψ be a bijection from histories of g
n
0 (;,C n) to histories of g n with the properties in Def. 3. Then a suitable bijection ϕ
from histories in [g
n
0 (;,C n)]hn f n to histories in [g n]hn f n can be deﬁned by letting ϕ(h) = h if h is a history of f n that does not






shows that this map is also onto.
Thus, CP0
f (;) ≈ CP0
g(;). Now consider p ∈ CPf (;), so for all p0 ∈ CP0
f (;), p ¼E p0. Then there exists
q ∈CP0
g(;) such that p ≈q; furthermore, for everyq0 ∈CP0
g(;), there is p0 ∈CP0
f (;) withq0 ≈p0, which, by
Relabeling Invariance implies that q ¼E q0. Hence, q ∈ CPg(;). By a symmetric argument, if q ∈ CPg(;),
there exists p ∈CPf (;) such that p ≈q. This completes the proof of the inductive step.
Turn now to the actual proof of necessity. Assume that (ii) holds in Theorem 1. Since each ¼E is
complete and transitive on F
p
E , and CPf (;)6=; for all f ∈ FE, it is clear that ¼E must also be complete and
transitive on all of FE. Next, the three axioms in (i) will be considered in turn. As will be clear, only Weak
Commitment requires somewhat special care.
Axiom 3.1, Sophistication. Let f ∈ FE and ﬁx a history h ∈ f ∩HE and a set B ⊂C f (h) as in the Axiom.
Clearly, Def. 9 implies that CPf (h)0 =
S
c∈Cf (h)CP0
f (h,c)(;) and similarly CP0




Fix p ∈ CPf (h) and q ∈ CPf (h,B)h f (h), and assume for deﬁniteness that p ∈ CP0
f (h,c)(;) and q ∈ CP0
f (h,b)(;);
then in particular p ∼E(h) f (h,c)¼E(h) f (h,b)∼q. Since f (h,b)E(h) f (h,c0) for all c0 ∈ B \C f (h), it must
be the case that c ∈ B, and hence p ∈ CPf (h,B)h f (h). Furthermore, it must be the case that f (h,c) ∼E(h)
f (h,b), and so q ∈CPf (h). Thus, CPf (h)=CPf (h,B)h f (h).
It is clear that, if ¯ h ∈ f neither strictly follows nor strictly precedes h, then CPf (¯ h) = CPf (h,B)h f (¯ h).
Since CPf (h) = CPf (h,B)h f (h), a simple induction argument shows that actually CPf (¯ h) = CPf (h,B)h f (¯ h)
for all histories ¯ h that weakly precede h, including ¯ h =;. By (ii) in Theorem 1, f ∼E f (h,B)h f .
Axiom 3.2, Weak Commitment. Let f ∈ FE and ﬁx a history h with the properties indicated in the
Axiom. Inparticular,notethat,ifa ∈C f (h)∩A,D ∈Ff (h,a)andb,b0 ∈C f ([h,a,D]),then f ([h,a,D],b)∼
f ([h,a,D],b0); this implies thatCPf ([h,a,D]) =
S
b∈Cf ([h,a,D])CPf ([h,a,D],b)(;). Now let g be a one-period
commitment version of f (h); I claim that CP0
f (h) ≈ CP0
gh f (h). To prove this claim, a suitable map ψ :
CP0
f (h)→CP0
gh f (h) will be constructed
Fix p ∈ CP0
f (h). If p = {;,[x]}, let ψ(p) = p. Otherwise, there is a ∈ A such that Cp(;) = {a} ⊂ C f (h),
and furthermore, for all D ∈ Fp(;,a) = Ff (h,a), p([a,D]) ∈ CPf ([h,a,D]). By the argument in the
previous paragraph, there is b[a,D] ∈ C f ([h,a,D]) such that p([a,D]) ∈ CPf ([h,a,D],b[a,D])(;). Now con-
sider the tree ¯ g that allows one-period commitment in f (h) and such that C ¯ g(;) = {a} and, for all
D ∈ F ¯ g(;,a) = Ff (h,a), C ¯ g([a,D]) = {b[a,D]}. Then for all D, ¯ g([a,D]) = f ([h,a,D],b[a,D]), and thus
p([a,D]) ∈ CP ¯ g([a,D]). Therefore, p ∈ CP0
¯ g(;). Since g is a one-period commitment version of f (h),
there is c ∈ Cg(;) such that g(;,c) ≈ ¯ g, and Lemma 7 implies that there exists q ∈ CP0
g(;,c)(;) such that




g(;,c)(;), so q ∈CP0
g(;)=CP0
gh f (h). Thus, let
ψ(p)=q.
39It is clear from the above construction that ψ is one-to-one. To see that it is onto, let q ∈ CP0
gh f (h) =
CP0
g(;). Then there is c ∈ Cg(;) such that q ∈ CP0
g(;,c)(;). By Def. 8, there is a tree ¯ g that allows one-
period commitment in f (h) and such that ¯ g ≈ g(;,c); by Lemma 7, this implies that there exists a unique
p ∈ CP0
¯ g(;) such that p ≈ q. I claim that p ∈ CP0
f (h) and ψ(p) = q. Note ﬁrst that, if p = {;,[x]},
then p = q and indeed ψ(p) = p = q; furthermore, also ¯ g = p, and so p ∈ CP0
f (h). Otherwise, let
Cp(;) = {a} ⊂C f (h), and note that Fp(;,a) = F ¯ g(;,c) = Ff (h,a). By Def. 9, for all D ∈ Fp(;), p([a,D]) ∈
CP ¯ g([a,D]); furthermore, ¯ g([a,D]) = f ([h,a,D],b[a,D]) for some b[a,D] ∈ C f ([h,a,D]). Thus, in the lat-
ter case, p([a,D]) ∈ CPf ([h,a,D],b[a,D](;); since all actions at [h,a,D] are equivalent, as argued above this
implies that p([a,D]) ∈ CPf ([h,a,D]). Thus, p ∈ CP0
f (h). Furthermore, it is clear that ¯ g is the tree that
allows one-period commitment constructed in the deﬁnition of ψ(p), and it follows that ψ(p)=q.
Hence, CP0
f (h) ≈ CP0
gh f (h). It is easy to verify33 that then also CPf (h) ≈ CPgh f (h). Clearly, if a history
¯ h of f neither precedes nor follows h, then ¯ h is also a history of gh f ; furthermore, [gh f ](¯ h) = f (¯ h), and
therefore CPf (h0) = CPgh f (h0). If instead ¯ h weakly precedes h, then ¯ h is also a history of gh f , but the
corresponding continuation trees are different; to complete the proof, in light of (ii) of Theorem 1 it is
sufﬁcient to show that, if the history ¯ h of f (weakly) precedes h, then CPf (¯ h)≈CPgh f (¯ h).
The claim is true if ¯ h = h, so argue by induction and assume it is true for all histories h0 > ¯ h that
(weakly) precede h and strictly follow ¯ h. Again, it is sufﬁcient to show that CP0
f (¯ h) ≈ CP0
gh f (¯ h). Note
ﬁrst that C f (¯ h) = Cgh f (¯ h) and, for all a ∈ C f (¯ h) ∩ A, Ff (¯ h,a) = Fgh f (¯ h,a). Now pick p ∈ CP0
f (¯ h); if
p = {;,[x]} for x ∈ X, then it is easy to see that also p ∈ CP0
gh f (;). Otherwise, let {a} = Cp(;) and, for
all D ∈ Fp(;,a) = Ff (¯ h,a), note that p([a,D]) ∈ CPf ([¯ h,a,D]). Hence, by the inductive hypothesis,
there is q[a,D] ∈ CPgh f ([¯ h,a,D]) such that p([a,D]) ≈ q[a,D]. Thus, let q ∈ FE(¯ h) be such that Cq(;) = {a},
Fq(;,a) = Fgh f (¯ h,a), and for all D ∈ Fq(;,a), q([a,D]) = q[a,D]. Then q ∈ CP0
gh f (¯ h), and by Lemma 4,
p ≈ q. By-now usual arguments imply that this construction yields a one-to-one, onto map of CP0
f (¯ h)
ontoCP0
gh f (¯ h), andagainthisimpliesthatalsoCPf (¯ h)≈CPgh f (¯ h). Thiscompletestheproofoftheclaim,
and establishes that Weak Commitment holds.







f (;,c)(;) = CP0
f (;,c)(;). Pick p ∈ CPf (;) and q ∈ CPf (;,B)(;), and for deﬁniteness assume that p ∈
CP0
f (;,c0)(;) and q ∈CP0
f (;,c00)(;). Then f ∼E p ∼E f (;,c0)∼E f (;,c00)∼E q ∼E f (;,B), as required.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2 (Eliciting Conditional Preferences)
To simplify the exposition, let Σ1 be the collection of non-null events in Σ.
Remark A.2 Fix E ∈Σ1 and let ≥ be a complete and transitive binary relation on FE such that
(i) for all x,y ∈X, x ≥y iff x ¼y;
33See e.g. the last step in the proof of Lemma 7
40(ii) if x ∈X satisﬁes x ¼ξ(h) [resp. x ´ξ(h)] for all h ∈ f ∩TE, then x ≥ f [resp f ≥x]; and
(iii) the setsU ={x ∈X :x ≥ f } and {x ∈X : f ≥x} are closed in X.
Then:
(a) for every f ∈ FE, there exists x ∈X such that x ≥ f and f ≥x (abbreviated x = f );
(b) if f > g, there is x ∈X such that f >x > g.
Proof: Since f is ﬁnite, there exist x0,x00 such that x0 ¼ x(z) ¼ x00 for all terminal histories z of f . By (i),
(ii) and transitivity, x0 ∈U and x00 ∈ L. By completeness,U ∪L =X. Since X is separable, the non-empty,
closed [by (iii)] sets U and L satisfy U ∩ L 6= ;; any x ∈ U ∩ L satisﬁes x ∼E f , which proves (a). For (b),
take x,y ∈X such that x = f and y = g. The claim follows from separability of X and (iii).
Turn now to the proof of Theorem 2. Assume that (ii) holds, and consider E ∈ Σ1. Suppose that
f ¼E f 0 and let x ∈ X be such that x ∼E f 0: such a prize exists by Remark A.2. Fix g ∈ TE: I claim that
f ¼∗
E,g f 0. To see this, suppose ﬁrst y x, so y E x by Axiom 3.4; then y E f 0 by transitivity, and Axiom
3.7 implies that {f 0,y}Eg ∼ yEg. Next, suppose that y ≺ x: again invoking Axiom 3.4 and transitivity
we get y ≺E f , and Axiom 3.7 implies {f ,y}Eg ∼ fEg. This proves the claim. In the opposite direction,
consider f , f 0 ∈ FE and g ∈ TE, and suppose that f ¼∗
E,g f 0; let x ∈ X be as in Def. 13. Suppose by
contradiction that x E f , so there exist y 0,y 00 ∈ X such that x E y 0 E y 00 E f (by Remark A.2). Now
Def. 13 implies {f ,y 0}Eg ∼ fEg ∼ {f ,y 00}Eg, but Axiom 3.7 and the assumption that E is not null imply
{f ,y 0}Eg ∼ y 0
Eg  y 00
E g ∼ {f ,y 00}Eg: contradiction. Hence, f ¼E x; similarly, x ¼E f 0, and it follows that
f ¼E f 0. Thus, f ¼E f 0 iff f ¼∗
E,g f 0 for all g ∈TE.
It remains to be shown that ¼ satisﬁes Axioms 3.10 and 3.9 (Axiom 3.8 is immediately implied by
Axioms 3.4 and 3.6). Consider ﬁrst Conjectural Separability (Axiom 3.10): let E ∈ Σ1, f ∈ FE, g,g 0 ∈ TE
and x,y ∈ X. For (i), suppose that {f ,y}Eg 6∼ fEg and x  y. If f ≺E y, then f ≺E x as well, and Axiom
3.7 implies that {f ,x}Eg 0 ∼xEg 0. By Axiom 3.7, it cannot be the case that f E y, so the only remaining
case is f ∼E y. Then also x E f , and again, Axiom 3.7 yields the required indifference. The argument
for (ii) is similar. Finally, consider Axiom 3.8. If ξ(h)  x for all h ∈ f ∩TE, then, since f is ﬁnite, there is
y ∈ X such that ξ(h) ¼ y for all h ∈ f ∩TE and y  x. Now Axiom 3.5 implies f ¼E y, and hence f E x;
now Axiom 3.7 implies {f ,x}Eg ∼E fEg, as required. The argument for (ii) is similar.
Now assume that (i) holds. To streamline the exposition, given E ∈ Σ1, g ∈ TE and f , f 0 ∈ FE call any
x ∈X with the properties in Def. 13 a cutoff for f ¼∗
E,g f 0.
Claim 1: For every E ∈Σ1 and g ∈TE, ¼∗
E,g is transitive.
Consider f , f 0, f 00 ∈ FE such that f ¼E,g f 0 and f 0 ¼E,g f 00, and let x,x0 ∈ X be the respective cutoffs.
Thenitmustbethecasethatx ¼x0; otherwise, considery 0,y 00 ∈X suchthatx0 y 0 y 00 x (whichexist
41by Remark A.2): then f ¼∗
E,g f 0 and E ∈ Σ1 imply {f 0,y 0}Eg ∼ y 0
Eg  y 00
E g ∼ {f 0,y 00}Eg, but f 0 ¼∗
E,g f 00
implies {f 0,y 0}Eg ∼ f 0
Eg ∼{f 0,y 00}Eg, a contradiction.
Now consider y ∈ X. If y x0, then f 0 ¼∗
E,g f 00 implies {y, f 00}Eg ∼ yEg; if instead y ≺x0, then y ≺x,
and f ¼∗
E,g f 0 implies {f ,y}Eg ∼ fEg. But this means precisely that x0 is a cutoff for f ¼∗
E,g f 00.
Claim 2: For all E ∈Σ1, g ∈TE and x,y ∈X: x ¼y iff x ¼∗
E,g y. In particular, x y implies {x,y}Eg ∼
xEg.
Suppose x ¼ y. For all x0  y, Axiom 3.9 implies that {x0,y}Eg ∼ x0
Eg; similarly, for all x0 ≺ y, also
x0 ≺x, and the same axiom implies {x,x0}Eg ∼xEg. Hence, y is a cutoff for x ¼∗
E,g y.
Conversely, suppose x ¼∗
E,g y and let y 0 be a cutoff. If y 0 ≺ z ≺ y, then Axiom 3.9 implies {z,y}Eg ∼
yEg, but Def. 13 requires {z,y}Eg ∼zEg: since E is non-null, this is a contradiction. Hence, y 0 ¼y, and
similarly x ¼y 0. By transitivity, x ¼y.
Claim3: Forevery E ∈Σ1, g ∈TE, f ∈ FE andx ∈X,either f ¼∗
E,g x orx ¼∗
E,g f (orboth). Inparticular,
if x,x0 ∈X satisfy x ¼ξ(h)¼x0 for all h ∈ f ∩TE, then x ¼∗
E,g f and f ¼∗
E,g x0.
Suppose that it is not the case that f ¼∗
E,g x. Then in particular x is not a cutoff; by Claim 2, for
all y  x, {y,x}Eg ∼ yEg, so there must be y ≺ x such that {f ,y}Eg 6∼ fEg. Then Axiom 3.10 implies
that, for all y 0  y, {f ,y 0}Eg ∼ y 0
Eg. On the other hand, for all y 0 ≺ y, also y 0 ≺ x, so Claim 2 implies
{x,y 0}Eg ∼xEg. Hence, y 0 is a cutoff for x ¼∗
E,g f .
Ifx,x0 areasabove,thenAxiom3.9impliesthat,foreveryy ≺x0,{f ,y}Eg ∼ fEg,andClaim2implies
that, for every y x0, {y,x0}Eg ∼yEg. Thus, f ¼∗
E,g x0, and the other relation follows similarly.
Claim 4: For every E ∈ Σ1, g ∈ TE and f ∈ FE, there exists x ∈ X such that x ∼∗
E,g f (i.e. x ¼∗
E,g f and
f ¼∗
E,g x both hold). Hence, ¼∗




E,g f {y :x ¼y}. Notice that L is an intersection of closed sets by Axiom 3.8, and hence is
closed. Also, the last part of Claim 3 shows that there always exists x ∈X such that x ¼∗
E,g f . Since ¼∗
E,g is
transitive, if f ¼∗
E,g y, then x ¼∗
E,g y (and hence x ¼ y) for every x ∈ X such that x ¼∗
E,g f : thus, f ¼∗
E,g y
implies y ∈ L. On the other hand, suppose f 6¼∗
E,g y: then in particular y cannot be a cutoff and, as in the
proof of Claim 3, there must exist x ≺ y such that {f ,x}Eg 6∼ fEg. Then Axiom 3.10 implies that, for all
x0  x, {f ,x0}Eg ∼ x0
Eg; also, by Claim 2, for all x0 ≺ x, {x,x0}Eg ∼ xEg. Thus, x is a cutoff for x ¼∗
E,g f ,
and since y 6∈ {y 0 :x ¼ y 0}, y 6∈ L. Thus, L = {y : f ¼∗
E,g y}; by the last part of the preceding claim, this set
is non-empty. Similarly,U ={y :y ¼∗
E,g f }, and this set is non-empty and closed.
By Claim 3,U ∪L =X, so there exists x ∈U ∩L, which by deﬁnition satisﬁes x ∼∗
E,g f .
Claim 5 For every E ∈Σ1 and g,g 0 ∈TE, ¼∗
E,g=¼∗
E,g 0.
Observe ﬁrst that, if f ¼∗
E,g x, then one can take x as cutoff. Suppose x0 is another cutoff: then
x0 ¼ x, because otherwise any y ∈ X such that x  y  x0 would satisfy {x,y}Eg ∼E xEg  yEg, which
42contradicts the assumption that x0 is a cutoff for f ¼∗
E,g x. Now take y ≺ x: then also y ≺ x0, and by
deﬁnition {f ,y}Eg ∼ fEg. Since y  x immediately implies {x,y}Eg ∼ yEg, it follows that indeed x is a
cutoff for f ¼∗
E,g x. Similarly, if x ¼∗
E,g f , then any cutoff x0 must satisfy x ¼x0, and in particular one can
take x as cutoff.
Also, it is enough to prove that, for f ∈ FE and x ∈X, f ¼∗
E,g x iff f ¼∗
E,g 0 x and x ¼∗
E,g f iff x ¼∗
E,g 0 f .
Suppose f ¼∗
E,g x; take x as the cutoff. To verify that f ¼∗
E,g 0 x, we also take x as cutoff, and by the
by-now usual argument, only check that y ≺ x implies {f ,y}Eg 0 ∼ fEg 0. If instead {f ,y}Eg 0 6∼ fEg 0 for
some y ≺x, then Axiom 3.10 implies that, for all x0 y, {f ,x0}Eg ∼E x0
Eg [observe that g is used instead
of g 0]. In particular, this holds for y 0,y 00 such that x  y 0  y 00  y, and since E ∈ Σ1, {f ,y 0}Eg ∼ y 0
Eg 
y 00
E g ∼{f ,y 00}Eg; but since x is a cutoff for f ¼∗
E,g x, it must be the case that {f ,y 0}Eg ∼ fEg ∼{f ,y 00}Eg:
contradiction. Reversing the roles of g and g 0 yields the ﬁrst part of the claim.
Similarly, suppose x ¼∗
E,g f ; again, take x as cutoff. Then x ¼∗
E,g 0 f can fail only if {y, f }Eg 0 6∼yEg 0 for
some y  x. But, in this case, Axiom 3.10 implies that {y 0, f }Eg ∼ fEg ∼ {y 00, f }Eg for y  y 0  y 00  x,
and this again yields a contradiction.
The proof of Theorem 2 can now be completed. Letting f ¼∗
E f 0 iff f ¼∗
E,g f 0 for some g ∈TE yields a
well-deﬁned, complete and transitive binary relation on FE. By Claim 2, this relation satisﬁes Axiom 3.4;
by Claim 3, it satisﬁes Axiom 3.5; by the arguments in Claim 4, it satisﬁes Axiom 3.6.
Finally, we verify that it also satisﬁes Axiom 3.7. Let E ∈Σ1, f ∈ FE,x ∈X and g ∈TE. Suppose f ∗
E x;
if {f ,x}Eg 6∼ fEg, then Axiom 3.10 implies that, for all y  x, {f ,y}Eg ∼ yEg; furthermore, for all y ≺ x,
{x,y}Eg ∼xEg. Thus, by deﬁnition x ¼∗
E,g f , which is a contradiction.
Similarly, suppose x ∗
E f ; if {f ,x}Eg 6∼ xEg, then for all y ≺ x, {f ,y}Eg ∼ fEg: again, for all y  x,
{x,y}Eg ∼xEg, which by deﬁnition means thatx is a cutoff for f ¼∗
E,g x. Again, a contradiction is found.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3 (Consistent Planning for MEU Preferences)
Note ﬁrst that, if E is non-null according to Def. 11, then minq∈C q(E)>0. Thus, all relevant conditional
preferences are well-deﬁned.
Now suppose (1) holds. Notice that Axiom 4.2 implies that, for all non-empty E ∈ Σ plans f ∈ FE,
f ∼E x if and only if fEg ∼ xEg, where g has the properties in Axiom 4.2. This is Axiom A9 in Pires
[33], and the results in that paper imply that ¼E is derived from ¼ via prior-by-prior Bayesian updating.
Hence, CPMEU and CP coincide, and (2) follows from Theorem 1.
Conversely, assume that (2) holds. Consider a plan f ∈ FE and a prize x ∈ X such that u(x) =
minq∈C
R
E u(f (ω))q(dω|E); one such prize must exist because X is connected and u is continuous. Now
consider the tree {f ,x} ∈ FE (cf. Def. 12); clearly, CPMEU{f ,x}(;) is precisely the set containing f and x;
by (2), we have f ∼E {f ,x}∼E x, i.e. f ∼E x.
43Thus,¼E isconsistentwithMEUandprior-by-priorBayesianupdatingofC. ThisimpliesthatCPMEU
and CP coincide, so Theorem (1) ensures that each preference is complete and transitive, and that Ax-
ioms 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 hold.
Finally, it follows from the properties of the MEU functional (see also [33] and [38]) that, if f is a plan
and g has the properties in Axiom 4.2, then f ¼E x if and only if fEg ¼xEg, i.e. Axiom 4.2 holds.
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47B Web Appendix for “Dynamic Choice Under Ambiguity”
B.1 Sophistication and the Value of Information
For simplicity, we assume that the individual’s preferences over plans admit a numerical representation,
denoted V(·), and that the individual is risk-neutral (so the restriction of V to X is afﬁne).
An information-acquisition problem is described by a (ﬁnite, for simplicity) state space Ω, an in-
formation partition I = {E1,...,En}, a set A of actions, and a payoff function ξ : Ω × A → R. Let
g be the partitional tree deﬁned by Cg(;) = {∗}, Fg(;,∗) = I, Cg([∗,Ei]) = A for all i = 1,...,n and
Cg([∗,Ei,a,{ω}])={ξ(ω,a)} for all i =1,...,n, a ∈A and ω∈ Ei. Clearly, the tree f in Fig. 6 exhibits this
structure.
Now consider the following sets of plans consistent with g:
• Ng = {p ⊂ g : ∃a ∈ ¯ A such that ∀i = 1,...,n, p([∗,Ei]) = a} contains plans that correspond to the
choice of a single action without taking the information I into account;
• Cg = {p ∈ F
p
Ω : p ⊂ g} corresponds to the contingent plans that could be implemented by the
individual if she could commit; and
• CPg(;) represents of course the plans that the individual can actually carry out.
Then:
• maxp∈Cg V(p)−maxp∈Ng V(p) is the value of information with commitment; it represents the “in-
trinsic” value of information;
• maxp∈CPg(;)V(p)−maxp∈Ng V(p) is the value of information without commitment (assuming so-
phistication); it reﬂects the “realized” value of information; and
• maxp∈Cg V(p)−maxp∈CPg(;)V(p) is the value of commitment.
By a simple set-inclusion argument, the ﬁrst and third quantities are positive; the second, on the other
hand, may be positive or negative.
Thus, as noted above, the present framework provides a straightforward way to disentangle the in-
trinsic value of information from the value of commitment, and separately assess their impact on the
realized value of information.
B.2 Consistent Planning for Inﬁnite Trees
This section adapts the Sophistication and Weak Commitment axioms of Sec. 3.1.1 and the deﬁnition
of Consistent Planning, Def. 9 to a class of inﬁnite decision trees. This makes it possible to state an
iextension of the main characterization result of Sec. 3.1.2 to this class. The main ideas behind this
extension have been discussed above in §4.3.
Continue to assume that Ω is an arbitrary state space and Σ an algebra of events. The following
topological assumptions on the set of labels A and the set of prizes X will be maintained.
Assumption B.1 X is a connected, separable metric space, and A is an uncountable, separable metric
space. The metrics on X and A will be denoted by dX and dA respectively.
TheroleoftheassumptionsaboutA istoensurethat“enoughlabels”existtorepresentanycollection
of continuation plans (recall that a cardinality assumption of A playis a similar role for ﬁnite trees): see
the discussion preceding Lemma 9 for details.
The metrizability assumption on X simpliﬁes the deﬁnition of a (pseudo)metric on the set of plans
(see below). Connectedness and separability ensure that (with the sole modiﬁcation described in Foot-
note 21), the elicitation result of Section 3.2 will hold for inﬁnite trees as well.
The class of trees considered here allows for uncountably many actions at each history. For simplic-
ity, the horizon is assumed ﬁnite; also, only a ﬁnite number of different events may be observed. For
instance, this class includes, but is not limited to, all decision trees generated by a ﬁnite ﬁltration. Fi-
nally, all prizes assigned at terminal histories must lie in some compact subset of X. Jointly with suitable
assumptions on preferences, this implies that such trees are “bounded in preference”.
Deﬁnition 14 Consider an event E ∈Σ\{;}. A tree f ⊂HE ∪TE is simple if maxh∈H λ(h) is ﬁnite, the set
{ξ(h) : h ∈ f ∩TE} is contained in a compact subset K of X, and furthermore the collection {E(h) : h ∈
f ∩HE} is ﬁnite. The set of simple trees starting at E is denoted F∗
E.
Clearly, FE ⊂ F∗
E; furthermore, observe that a simple plan (i.e. a tree p ∈ F∗
E ∩F
p
E ) is ﬁnite.
The relabeling relation ≈ was deﬁned above (cf. Def. 3) for trees in FE; however, the same deﬁni-
tion applies verbatim to trees in F∗
E. Furthermore, it is convenient to introduce notation to indicate the
collection of all relabelings of a tree f (ﬁnite or otherwise).
Deﬁnition 15 For every f ∈ F∗
E, denote the set of ≈-equivalence classes of f by [f ]={g ∈ FE : g ≈ f }.
A semimetric on the set of plans will now be introduced.34 The following deﬁnition is motivated by
twointuitive considerations. First, trees thatexhibita differentstructuremustbe “far”fromone another,
regardless of their payoffs. Second, the distance between two trees that have the same structure is a
function of the distance between payoffs assigned at corresponding histories. Thus, action labels do not
34While one could extend the deﬁnition provided below to arbitrary trees, this is not required for our purposes.
iiaffect the proposed notion of distance between trees. The similarity of the following deﬁnition with that
of relabeling (Def. 3) should then not be surprising:
Deﬁnition 16 (Plan distance) Consider an event E ∈ Σ\{;} and plans p,p0 ∈ F∗
E. The distance between
p and p0, denoted d(p,p0), is deﬁned as follows. If there exists a bijection ϕ :p →p0 such that
(i) for all h, ¯ h ∈p, h ≤ ¯ h iff ϕ(h)≤ϕ(¯ h); and








Notice that conditions (i) and (ii) are exactly as in Def. 3; there is no need for a counterpart to condition
(iii) in the deﬁnition of relabeling, because attention is restricted to plans. In other words, conditions (i)
and (ii) in the deﬁnition of relabeling fully characterize what it means for two plans to “have the same
structure.” Therefore, according to Def. 16, the plans p and p0 have the same structure if and only if
d(p,p0)<1; otherwise, d(p,p0)=1.
The maximum in Def. 16 is achieved because a plan has only ﬁnitely many terminal histories.
Observe that d is not a metric on the set of plans in F∗
E. In particular, if p ≈q, then d(p,q) = 0. It is,
however, a metric on the set of ≈-equivalence classes of plans, FE/≈.
Additional Notation: Closure of a set G of plans with respect to d will be denoted by clG, and con-
vergence of a sequence {pn} of plans to a plan p will be denoted by pn → p. Abusing notation, if G is a
set of equivalence classes of plans in FE, then clG will also be used to denote the d-closure ofG in FE/≈.
Turn now to the axioms characterizing Consistent Planning. As should be expected, a notion of con-
tinuity of preferences is necessary. It is enough to require continuity for preferences over plans:
Axiom B.1 (Plan Continuity) For every non-empty E ∈ Σ and every collection of plans p,q,p1,p2,... ∈
F
p
E : if pn ¼E q (resp. pn ´q) for all n ≥1 and pn →p, then p ¼E q (resp p ´E q).
Next, consider Sophistication and Weak Commitment, the main behavioral axioms in Sec. 3.1.1.
As noted in §4.3, Sophistication must be modiﬁed by adding a “closure” condition, which will be de-
scribed shortly. However, both Sophistication and Weak Commitment require further modiﬁcations,
arising from entirely different (and more mundane) considerations.
To elaborate, note that the ﬁnite-tree versions of Sophistication and Weak Commitment (Axioms 3.1
and 3.2) allow modifying a tree f at one history only. However, since only ﬁnite trees are considered, it is
intuitively clear that, by repeatedly applying one or the other axiom, one eventually obtains a tree f 0 that
iiidoes not permit further applications of either axiom—an “irreducible” tree. This fact is used in the proof
of sufﬁciency in Theorem 1.
It is clear that this will not be the case for an inﬁnite tree: one cannot reach an irreducible tree in
ﬁnitely many steps. To address this issue, both Sophistication and Weak Commitment must be strength-
ened so as to allow for the simultaneous modiﬁcation of the original tree f at inﬁnitely many histories.
In particular, the formulation chosen here allows for the modiﬁcation of continuation plans at all non-
terminal histories of a certain length t. This is notationally intensive, but conceptually straightforward.
Preliminary notation is required to indicate that two trees share all histories of length t:
Deﬁnition 17 Consider two trees f , f 0 ∈ FE. Then f and f 0 agree up to time t, denoted f =t f 0, if
{h ∈ f :λ(h)≤t}={h ∈ f 0 :λ(h)≤t}.
The appropriate version of Sophistication for simple inﬁnite trees can now be stated.
Axiom B.2 (Sophistication for Simple Inﬁnite Trees) Consider E ∈ Σ\{;}, a tree f ∈ F∗
E, and an integer
t ≥0. If, for every history h ∈ f of length t:
(i) for every c ∈C f (h), f (h,c) is a plan, and
(ii) there is a non-empty B(h) ⊂ C f (h) such that p E(h) q for all p ∈ cl {f (h,b) : b ∈ B(h)} and
q ∈cl {f (h,c):c ∈C f (h)}\cl {f (h,b):b ∈ B(h)},
then f ∼ g for every tree g ∈ F∗
E that satisﬁes f =t g and {[g(h,c)] : c ∈ Cg(h)} = cl {[f (h,b)] : b ∈ B(h)}
for every h ∈ f of length t.
As noted above, this axiom essentially entails modifying a tree f at all histories of a speciﬁed length t.
Condition (i) in the present axiom restricts attention to trees wherein all time-t continuation subtrees
are plans. This is for simplicity: a notion of distance, and an attendant notion of continuity, was only
deﬁned for plans, not arbitrary trees; hence, to apply the “closure” condition discussed in §4.3 to all
length-t histories, it is necessary to ensure that each action at such histories correspond to a plan.35
Condition(ii)isthekey“closure”requirement. Toeaseinterpretation,informallyidentifyeachchoice
available at h with the corresponding continuation plan; then condition (ii) requires that every choice in
the “closure” of B(h) be strictly preferred to any choice that lies in the “closure” of C f (h), but not in the
closure of B(h).
If Conditions (i) and (ii) hold, then the axiom asserts the indifference of f with a tree g that differs
from f in that, at every history h of length t, the continuation tree f (h) is, again loosely speaking, re-
placed with the “closure” of B(h).
35An extension that drops this restriction is feasible, but complicates the notation further.
ivTemporarilydeferthediscussionoftechnicalaspects; toﬁxideas,supposethatX =R,andconsidera
very simple tree f where the set of choices available at the initial history is the half-open interval [0,1).36
Then, with the obvious ordering of prizes in X = R, the set B(;) = (
1
2,1) satisﬁes Condition (ii), and the
axiom implies that f is indifferent to a tree g that offers the choices [
1
2,1] at the initial history. If one now
applies the same axiom to the tree g, taking B(;) = {1}, one concludes that f and g are both indifferent
to the constant tree corresponding to the prize 1. As can be seen, the axiom encodes the key assumption
discussed in Sec. 4.3: a set of alternatives is just as good as its “supremum”, regardless of whether or not
this can be achieved.
Turn now to technical aspects. The equality {[g(h,c)] : c ∈Cg(h)} = cl {[f (h,b)] :b ∈ B(h)}, where h
is a history of length t in f , is easiest to interpret if one again identiﬁes choices in B(h) with the corre-
sponding continuation plans in f . With this informal convention, the above equality requires that every
choice c available at the history h in the tree g correspond (up to relabeling) to a choice in the “closure”
of B(h), and conversely.37
Notice that, in particular, taking B(h)=C f (h)for all historiesh of lengtht trivially satisﬁes condition
(ii); thus, Axiom B.2 requires that the individual be indifferent to taking the “closure” of all choice sets at
length-t histories. As a further special case, if h is a terminal history of length t, so C f (h) is a singleton
set{x}, then conditions (i)and (ii) both hold ath, and furthermore thetree g in Axiom B.2must coincide
with f at history h. In other words, terminal histories of length t are left unchanged.
Finally, observe that, since all prizes in f lie in a compact subset K of of the metric space X, the same
is true of all prizes in any tree g as in the Axiom. Thus, g is indeed a simple tree according to Def. 14.
The Weak Commitment axiom only requires mechanical modiﬁcations of the type described imme-
diately before Axiom B.2.
Axiom B.3 (Weak Commitment for Simple Inﬁnite Trees) Consider E ∈ Σ \ {;}, a tree f ∈ FE, and an
integer t ≥0. If, for every history h0 ∈ f with λ(h0)=t +1,
(i) for every c ∈C f (h0), f (h0,c) is a plan, and
(ii) for all c,c0 ∈C f (h0), f (h0,c)∼E(h0) f (h0,c0),
then f ∼E g for all g ∈ FE such that f =t g and {[g(h,c)]:c ∈Cg(h)}={[g 0]: g 0 ∈ FE(h) allows one-period
commitment in f (h)} for every history h ∈ f of length t.
36Formally, f ={;}∪{[x]:x ∈[0,1)}.
37To see this, pick c ∈ Cg(h). Then the axiom requires that the ≈-equivalence class [g(h,c)] lie in the closure of {[f (h,b)] :
b ∈ B(h)}, which is the case precisely if there is a sequence {bn}⊂ B(h) such that f (h,bn)→ g(h,c). Conversely, if f (h,bn)→p
for some {bn} ⊂ B(h), then [p] ∈ {[g(h,c)] : c ∈ Cg(h)}, which is the case precisely if p ≈ g(h,c) for some c ∈ Cg(h). Notice
that this formulation allows for the possibility that two or more choices in Cg(h) correspond to plans that are equivalent up
to relabeling: this is not the case in the ﬁnite-tree version of Sophistication. However, the Simpliﬁcation axiom renders this
difference irrelevant.
vAs was the case for Sophistication, the above version of Weak Commitment restricts attention to
trees wherein continuation plans at histories of length t +1 are plans: see condition (i). Observe that,
consequently, each tree allowing one-period commitment in f (h) (cf. Def. 7) is a plan.
The axiom requires that, if conditions (i) and (ii) hold, then, for every history h of length t, f (h) can
be replaced with one of its one-period-commitment versions (cf. Def. 8).38
Finally, the deﬁnition of consistent planning requires only minimal modiﬁcations.
Deﬁnition 18 (Consistent Planning for Simple Trees) Consideratree f ∈ F∗
E. Foreveryterminalhistory
h ∈ f ∩TE, let CPSf (h) = {f (h)}. Inductively, if h ∈ f ∩HE and CPSf (h0) has been deﬁned for all h0 ∈ f




p ∈ FE(h) : ∃c ∈C f (h) s.t. Cp(;)={c}, Fp(;,c)=Ff (h,c) and





f (h) : ∀p0 ∈CPS0
f (h), p ¼E(h) p0
o
A tree g ∈ FE is a consistent-planning solution of f if g ∈CPSf (;).
Due to the deﬁnition of distance on F
p
E , if p ∈ CPS0
f (h), then any q ≈ p is an element of cl CPS0
f (h) as
well. Consequently, if p is a consistent-planning solution of f , then so is any relabeling of p.39
It is formally necessary to restate the relabeling-invariance assumption for simple inﬁnite trees.
Assumption B.2 For all non-empty E ∈Σ and all f ,g ∈ F∗
E: f ≈ g implies f ∼E g.
The counterpart to Theorem 1 for simple inﬁnite trees can ﬁnally be stated.
Theorem 8 Consider a system of preferences {¼E};6=E∈Σ that satisﬁes Assumption B.2 and such that, for
every non-empty E ∈ Σ, the restriction of ¼E to F
p
E is complete and transitive, and satisﬁes Axiom B.1.
Then the following statements are equivalent.
1. For every non-empty E ∈ Σ, ¼E is complete and transitive on all of F∗
E; furthermore, Axioms B.2,
B.3 and 3.3 hold;
2. for any E ∈ Σ and every pair of acts f ,g ∈ F∗
E: f ¼E g if and only if p ¼E q for some (hence all)
p ∈CPSf (;) and q ∈CPSg(;).
38There is a slight difference with Def. 8: Axiom B.3 allows for the possibility that two or more choices in Ch(h) lead to plans
that are equivalent up to relabeling (as was the case in Axiom B.2). This slightly simpliﬁes notation in the proof of Theorem 8,
and is irrelevant under the Simpliﬁcation axiom.
39In the proposed deﬁnition for ﬁnite trees, a relabeling of a consistent-planning solution is not itself a consistent-planning
solution; however, it is indifferent to it. Therefore, under relabeling indifference, Theorems 1 and 8 have exactly the same
behavioral content.
viB.3 Proof of Theorem 8 (Consistent Planning for Simple Inﬁnite Trees)
B.3.1 Preliminaries
Begin with two simple results related to the notion of plan convergence. The ﬁrst follows immediately
from Def. 16.
Remark B.1 Consider a sequence of plans {pn} ⊂ F∗
E and a plan p ∈ F∗
E. Let {an} = Cpn(;) and {a} =
Cp(;). Assume that a ∈ A. Then pn → p iff for every n, Fpn(;,an) = Fp(;,a) and pn([an,D]) → p([a,D])
for every D ∈Fp([;,a]).
Of course, it is also the case that, if a ∈ X, i.e. p = {;,[a]}, then pn = {;,[an]} for some {an} ⊂ X such
that an →a.
The second result relates the closure of sets of plans to the closure of equivalence classes of plans. Re-
call that the semimetric d in Def. 16 can also be viewed as a metric on each F
p
E /≈, by letting d([p],[q])=
d(p,q) for every p,q ∈ F
p
E . Thus, [pn] → [p] means that d([pn],[p]) = d(pn,p) → 0; furthermore, if
G≈ ⊂ F
p
E /≈, then clG ={[p]∈ F
p
E /≈:∃{[pn]}⊂G≈,[pn]→[p]}.
Remark B.2 Let E ∈Σ\; andG ⊂ F
p
E . Then clG =
S
cl {[g]: g ∈G}=cl
S
{[g]: g ∈G}.
Proof: Let [G] = {[g] : g ∈G}. Suppose p ∈ clG, so there is {pn} ⊂G such that pn → p. Then [pn] ∈ [G],
and furthermore d([p],[pn]) → 0. Thus, [p] ∈ cl [G]. Conversely, suppose that [pn] → [p] and [pn] ∈ [G].
Then by def. pn ∈G and d(pn,p)→0. This proves the ﬁrst equality.
For the second equality, suppose p ∈
S
cl [G], so [p]∈cl [G]. Hence there is some sequence {pn}⊂G





[G]. Conversely, suppose p ∈ cl
S
[G], so pn → p for some sequence {pn} ⊂
S
[G]. Then,
for every n, [pn]∈[G], and by deﬁnition d([pn],[p])→0. Thus, [p]∈cl [G], and therefore p ∈
S
cl [G].
Notation. It is useful to let FX = {;,[x] : x ∈ X} be the set of plans corresponding to an immediate
payoff. Observe that, for every p ∈ FX, [p]={p} and similarly cl {p}={p}.
As noted above, A is assumed to be an uncountable, separable metric space; thus, it has the cardinal-
ity of the continuum. Together with the assumption that X is a metric space, this leads to the following
simple result:
Lemma 9 Fix E ∈ Σ\{;} and f ∈ F∗
E. IfG ⊂ {p ∈ F
p
E : p ⊂ f }, then cl {[p] : p ∈G} is a compact subset of
F
p
E /≈, and there exists g ∈ FE such that {[g(;,c)]:c ∈Cg(;)}=cl {[p]:p ∈G}.
viiIn particular, this ensures that Axioms B.2 and B.3 do not hold vacuously. It will also be invoked several
times in the next section.
Proof: It is enough to prove the result for the caseC f (;)∩X =;. To see this, letGX =G ∩FX; by assump-
tion,C f (;)∩X lies in a compact subset of X, and it is immediate from the deﬁnition of d thatGX lies in a
compact subset of of FX, and hence of F
p
E /≈. Since cl {[p]p ∈G}=cl {[p]:p ∈GX}∪cl {[p]:p ∈G \GX}
by our deﬁnition of distance, and cl {[p] : p ∈GX} is compact, then cl {[p];p ∈G} is closed if cl {[p] : p ∈
G \GX} is. Furthermore, if {[g(;,a)] : a ∈Cg(;)} = cl {[p] :∈G \GX}, then the tree g 0 = g ∪cl GX has the
required properties.
Thus, assume C f (;)∩X = ;. As above, for any set C of plans, let [C] = {[p] : p ∈ C}. Since {E(h) :
h ∈ H} is ﬁnite, there is a ﬁnite partition G1,...,GN of G such that p ∈ Gn and p0 ∈ Gm have the same
“structure”, i.e. admit a bijection ϕ with the properties in Def. 16, if and only if n = m. Also, clearly
cl [G]=cl [G1]∪...∪cl [GN], and cl [Gn]∩cl [Gm]=; whenever n 6=m.
Since f is simple, there exists a compact set K ⊂ X such that ξ(z) ∈ K for all z ∈ f ∩TE. Then, for
every n, cl [Gn] is (homeomorphic to) a subset of K Mn, where Mn is the number of terminal histories in
any p ∈Gn; therefore, this set is compact, and hence so is cl [G]. This implies that cl [G] has at most the
cardinality of the continuum.
It follows that there exists a subset ¯ A of A such that ¯ A and cl [G] have the same cardinality, so there
exists a bijection α : cl [G] → ¯ A. Now deﬁne g ∈ F∗
E(h) as follows. First, let Cg(;) = {α([p]) : [p] ∈ cl [G]}.
Then, for every [p] ∈ cl [G], let Fg(;,α([p])) = Fp(;,a), where p is a member of [p] and Cp(;) = {a}; and
for every D ∈ Fg(;,α([p])), let g([α([p]),D]) = p([a,D]). Clearly, g(;,α[p]) ≈ p by Lemma 7. Thus, for
every a ∈Cg(;), g(;,a)≈p for some p ∈[p]∈cl [G], and conversely for every [p]∈cl [G], α([p]) satisﬁes
g(;,α[p])≈p. This proves the claim.
Clearly, the Lemma also implies the existence of g ∈ FE such that {[g(;,c)]:c ∈Cg(;)}={[p]:p ∈G}.
Furthermore:
Lemma 10 Fix E ∈ Σ\{;} and f ∈ F∗
E. IfG ⊂ {p ∈ FE : p is a plan and p ⊂ f } and ¼E satisﬁes Axiom B.1,
then the set {p ∈clG :∀p0 ∈clG,p ¼E p0} is non-empty and closed.
Proof: Lemma 9 shows that cl [G] = cl {[p] : p ∈G} is a compact subset of F
p




E / ≈ by letting [p] ¼≈
E [q] iff p ¼E q for all p,q ∈ F
p
E . By Relabeling Invariance, ¼≈
E is
well-deﬁned, and it satisﬁes the appropriate version of Axiom B.1. The existence of a ¼≈
E–maximal tree
in cl [G] now follows e.g. from [1, Theorem 2.41].
By Remark B.2, clG =
S
cl [G]; it is then clear that, if [p]∈cl [G] satisﬁes [p]¼≈
E [q] for all [q]∈cl [G],
then p ∈ clG and p ¼E q for all q ∈ clG: thus, the setG∗ = {p ∈ clG : ∀p0 ∈ clG,p ¼E p0} is non-empty.
Conversely, if p ∈G∗, then [p]∈cl [G] and, for every [q]∈cl [G], [p]¼≈
E [q].
viiiFurthermore, suppose pn → p for some {pn} ⊂ G∗ and p ∈ F
p
E . Then [pn] → [p], and for every
[q]∈cl [G], [pn]¼≈
E [q]. By Plan continuity for ¼≈
E, [p] is also ¼≈
E-maximal, so p ∈G∗. Thus,G∗ is closed.
Notice that, in particular, this ensures that the sets CPSf (h) in Def. 18 are non-empty and closed.
B.3.2 Sufﬁciency
Assume ﬁrst that (i) in Theorem 8 holds. Fix a tree f ∈ F∗
E, let T = maxh∈H λ(h) and let f 0,..., f T be the
sequence of trees constructed as follows. First, let f T = f . Then, for t = T −1,...,0, construct a tree f t
such that f t =t f and, for every length-t history h, {[f t(h,c)] : c ∈ C f t (h)} = {[p] : p ∈ CPSf (h)}; the
existence of such trees follows from Lemma 9.
It will be shown that, for all t = 0,...,T −1, f t ∼E f t+1. To streamline the presentation, for all h ∈
f ∩TE, let
Commt
f (h)={ ¯ g ∈ FE(h) : ¯ g allows one-period commitment in f t(h)}.




Proof: Clearly, any p ∈ FX allows one-period commitment in any tree; conversely, if some p = {;,[x]} ∈
FX allows one-period commitment in f t+1(h), then x ∈ C f t+1(h); since f t+1 =t+1 f , x ∈ C f (h) and so
obviously p ∈CPS0
f (h). So, it is enough to restrict attention to equivalence classes of plans p 6∈ FX.
Consider p ∈ CPS0
f (h) \ FX; let {a} = Cp(;), so a ∈ A, and note that, by deﬁnition, for every D ∈
Fp(;,a)=Ff (h,a),p([a,D])∈CPSf ([h,a,D]). Byconstruction,{[f t+1([h,a,D],b)]:b ∈C f t+1([h,a,D])}=
{[q] :q ∈ CPSf ([h,a,D])}: thus, there exists bD ∈C f t+1([h,a,D]) such that p([a,D]) ≈ f t+1([h,a,D],bD).
Finally, let p0 ∈ FE(h) be a plan such that p0 =t+1 p and, for all D ∈Fp(;,a), p0([a,D])= f t+1([h,a,D],bD).
Clearly, p0 ∈Commt+1
f (h) and p ≈p0 by Lemma 4. Thus, {[p]:p ∈CPS0
f (h)}⊂{[p]:p ∈Commt+1
f (h)}.
In the opposite direction, consider p ∈ Commt+1
f (h)\ FX; thus, there is a ∈ C f (h) = C f t+1(h) with
a ∈ A and, for every D ∈ Ff (h,a) = Ff t+1(h,a), an action bD ∈ C f t+1([h,a,D]) such that Cp(;) = {a},
Fp(;,a)=Ff (h,a)andforeveryD asabovep([a,D])= f t+1([h,a,D],bD). Butsince{[f t+1([h,a,D],b)]:
b ∈ C f t+1([h,a,D])} = {[q] : q ∈ CPSf ([h,a,D])}, there exists qD ∈ CPSf ([h,a,D]) such that p([a,D]) =
f t+1([h,a,D],bD)≈qD. Finally, let p0 ∈ FE(h) be a plan such that p0 =t+1 p and, for all D ∈Fp(;,a). Then
clearly p0 ∈CPS0
f (h) and p0 ≈p. The claim follows.
Claim 2. For all t =0,...,T −1, f t ∼E f t+1.
ixProof: Fix one such t and let f t
0 ∈ FE be a tree such that (i) f t
0 =t f , and (ii) for all h ∈ f with λ(h) = t,
{[f t
0(h,c)] : c ∈ C f t
0(h)} = {[p] : p ∈ CPS0
f (h)}; such a tree exists by Lemma 9.40 By (i), f t
0 =t f t+1, and by
Claim 1, for all h ∈ f with λ(h)=t, {[f t
0(h,c)]:c ∈C f t
0(h)}={[p]:p ∈Commt+1
f (h)}.
Furthermore, consider a,D such that [h,a,D] ∈ f ; ﬁx two choices c,c0 ∈C f t+1([h,a,D]). By the deﬁ-
nitionof f t+1,thereexistp,p0 ∈CPSf ([h,a,D])suchthat f t+1([h,a,D],c)≈p and f t+1([h,a,D],c0)≈p0;
since p ∼[h,a,D] p0, it follows that f t+1([h,a,D],c)∼[h,a,D] f t+1([h,a,D],c0) as well.
Weak Commitment (Axiom B.3) can now be invoked (letting f = f t+1 and g = f t
0 in the statement of
the axiom) to conclude that f t+1 ∼E f t
0.
Next, let f t
1 ∈ FE be a tree such that (i) f t
1 =t f and (ii) for every h ∈ f with λ(h) = t, {[f t
1(h,a)] :
a ∈ C f t
1(h)} = cl {[p] : p ∈ CPS0
f (h)}. Then also f t
1 =t f t
0, and one can invoke Axiom B.2 [with f = f t
0,
B(h)=C f t
0(h) and g = f t
1] to conclude that f t
1 ∼E f t
0.
Now, for every h ∈ f with λ(h) = t, let C(h) = {c ∈ C f t
1(h) : ∀c0 ∈ C f t
1(h), f t
1(h,c) ¼E(h) f t
1(h,c0)}. Let
G = {f t
1(h,c) : c ∈C f t
1(h)} for simplicity; then, by Lemma 10, the set G∗ = {p ∈ cl G : ∀p0 ∈G,p ¼E p0} is
non-empty and closed.
Observe that [G] ≡ {[p] : p ∈ G} = {[f t
1(h,c)] : c ∈ C f t
1(h)} = cl {[p] : p ∈ CPS0
f (h)}, i.e. [G] = cl [G].






E(h) :∃c ∈C f t
1(h),q ≈ f t
1(h,c)}. Hence, every
p ∈ G∗ is such that p ≈ f t
1(h,c) for some c ∈ C f 1
t (h); indeed, it is clear that c ∈ C(h), because G ⊂ cl G.
Since d(p, f t
1(h,c)) = 0, G∗ ⊂ cl {f t
1(h,c) : c ∈ C(h)}; furthermore, for every c ∈ C(h) and q ∈ cl G, we
have q ≈ f t
1(h,c0) for some c0 ∈ C f t
1(h), so f t
1(h,c) ¼E(h) q: thus, {f t
1(h,c) : c ∈ C(h)} ⊂ G∗. Hence,
G∗ =cl {f t
1(h,c):c ∈C(h)}. In particular, C(h) is non-empty.
It is clear that the tree f t
1 satisﬁes Condition (i) in Axiom B.2. To verify that it satisﬁes Condition (ii)
as well for B(h) =C(h), let p ∈ cl {f t
1(h,c) : c ∈C(h)} =G∗ and q ∈ cl {f t
1(h,c0) : c0 ∈C f t
1(h)}\cl {f t
1(h,c) :
c ∈C(h)}={q ∈ F
p
E(h) :∃c0 ∈C f t
1(h),q ≈ f t
1(h,c)}\G∗. Then it is clear that p E(h) q, as required.
It will now be shown that {[f t([h,c]):c ∈C f t (h)}=cl {[f t
1(h,c)]:c ∈C(h)} for any history h as above.
Note ﬁrst that the set on the r.h.s. is simply {[f t
1(h,c)] : c ∈ C(h)}, because Lemma 10 implies that the
latter is closed. Consider ﬁrst c ∈ C f t (h); thus, by construction, f t(h,c) ∈ CPSf (h). [Recall that CPSf (h)
is closed under relabeling, unlike CPf (h).] Hence, f t(h,c) ¼E(h) q for all q ∈ cl CPS0
f (h): in particular,
f t(h,c) ¼E(h) f t
1(h,c0) for all c0 ∈C f t
1(h) [again using the fact that cl CPS0
f (h) is closed under relabeling].
Moreover, since f t(h,c) ∈ cl CPS0
f (h), there is c1 ∈ C f t
1(h) such that f t(h,c) ≈ f t
1(h,c1). It follows that
c1 ∈C(h). Thus, {[f t([h,c]):c ∈C f t (h)}⊂cl {[f t
1(h,c)]:c ∈C(h)}.
Conversely, consider c ∈ C(h), so f t
1(h,c) ∈ cl CPS0
f (h). By assumption, for every q ∈ cl CPS0
f (h),
there is c ∈ C f t
1(h) such that f t
1(h,c) ≈ q, and by construction f t
1(h,c) ¼E(h) q. Thus, f t
1(h,c) ∈ CPSf (h).
This implies that there exists c0 ∈ C f t (h) such that f t
1(h,c) ≈ f t(h,c0). Thus, {[f t([h,c]) : c ∈ C f t (h)} ⊃
cl {[f t
1(h,c)]:c ∈C(h)}, and the proof of the subclaim is complete.
40Also note that this is automatically true for f ∈ f ∩TE.
xFinally, invoke Sophistication (Axiom B.2 [with f = f t
1, B(h) = C(h) and g = f t] to conclude that
f t
1 ∼E f t. By transitivity, f t+1 ∼E f t
0 ∼E f t
1 ∼E f t, and the proof of the Claim is complete.
The proof of sufﬁciency can now be completed, essentially as for ﬁnite trees. Observe that f = f T ∼E
f 0 by transitivity, and for all c,c0 ∈ C f 0(;), f 0(;,c) ∼E f 0(;,c0): thus, Simpliﬁcation implies f 0(;,c) ∼E f
for every c ∈ C f (;. Now consider g ∈ CPSf (;): by construction, there is some cp ∈ C f 0(;) such that
p ≈ f 0(;,cp); by Relabeling Invariance and transitivity, g ∼E f 0(;,cp)∼E f , as required.
B.3.3 Necessity
As is the case for ﬁnite trees, CPSf (h)=CPSf (h)(;). Furthermore, we have the following simple facts.
Lemma 11 Let f ∈ F∗
E and h ∈ f . If f (h,c)∈ F
p




{[f (h,c)]:c ∈C f (h)};
(ii)
S





cl {[f (h,c)]:c ∈C f (h)}=cl {f (h,c):c ∈C f (h)};
(iv) if C f (h)={c}, then CPSf (h)=[f (h,c)].
Proof: Begin with (iv). Argue by induction on the maximum length of f (h,c). If c ∈ X, the claim is
trivially true. Thus, suppose the claim is true for h ∈ f and c ∈ C f (h) with max{λ(h0) : h0 ∈ f (h,c)} ≤ L,
and consider h such that max{λ(h0):h0 ∈ f (h,c)}= L+1. Clearly, c ∈A; by the induction hypothesis, the
claim is true at all histories [h,c,D], for every D ∈ Ff (h,c). Then CPS0
f (h) = {p : Cp(;) = {c} and ∀D ∈
Fp(;,c)=Ff (h,c),p([c,D])≈ f ([h,c,D])}, which implies that the claim is again true.
Now consider (i). Since, for every a ∈ C f (h)∩A and D ∈ Ff (h,a), f ([h,a,D]) ∈ F
p
D, (iv) implies that
CPSf ([h,a,D]) = [f ([h,a,D])]. Thus, consider p ∈ CPS0
f (h), and let {c} = Cp(;) ⊂ C f (h). Any c ∈ X,
trivially belongs to the union in the r.h.s. of (i). If c ∈ A, then Fp(;,c) = Ff (h,c) and for every D in this
set, p([c,D])≈ f ([h,c,D]); Lemma 4 then implies that p ≈ f (h,c), which implies the claim.
For (ii), it is clear that any f (h,c) with c ∈ C f (h)∩X also belongs to CPS0
f (h). Thus, consider p0 ∈
S
{[f (h,a)] : a ∈ C f (h)∩A}, so p0 ≈ f (h,a) for some a ∈ C f (h)∩A. Let {a0} = Cp(h). Then Fp0(;,a0) =
Ff (h,a) and for every D in this collection p0([a0,D]) ≈ f ([h,a,D]). Now consider the plan p ∈ F
p
E(h)
such that Cp(;) = {a}, Fp(;,a) = Fp0(;,a0) and for everyD in this set p([a,D]) = p0([a0,D]). Then clearly
p ≈p0, and furthermore, arguing as above, p ∈CPS0
f (h). Since d(p,p0)=0, the claim follows.
Finally, (iii) follows from (i), (ii) and Remark B.2.
Turn now to the actual proof of necessity. Assume that (ii) in Theorem 8 holds. Completeness and
transitivity is immediate. Thus, the three axioms in (i) will be considered in turn.
xiAxiom B.2, Sophistication. Consider t, f ∈ F∗
E, Ht, g and B(h), h ∈ Ht as in the Axiom. Consider p ∈
CPSf (h) ⊂ cl CPS0
f (h) = cl {f (h,c) : c ∈ C f (h)}, where the equality follows from Lemma 11; by construc-
tion, p ¼E(h) f (h,b)forallb ∈ B(h), socondition(ii)intheaxiomimpliesthatp ∈cl{f (h,b):b ∈ B(h)}.41
By assumption cl {[f (h,b)] : b ∈ B(h)} = {[g(h,c)] : c ∈ Cg(h)}, so by Remark B.2 and (iii) in Lemma 11,
p ∈ cl {g(h,c) : c ∈ Cg(h)} = cl CPS0
g(h). Furthermore, consider q ∈ cl CPS0
g(h) = cl {g(h,c) : c ∈ Cg(h)},
where again the equality follows from (iii) in Lemma 11. By Remark B.2, q ∈
S
cl {[g(h,c)] : a ∈Cg(h)} =
S
{[g(h,c)] : c ∈ Cg(h)} =
S
cl {[f (h,b)] : b ∈ B(h)} = cl {f (h,b) : b ∈ B(h)}; hence, there is a sequence
{bn} ⊂ B(h) such that f (h,bn) → q, and the assumptions imply that p ¼E(h) f (h,bn) for each n. Plan
Continuity now ensures that p ¼E(h) q. Thus, p ∈CPSg(h), i.e. CPSf (h)⊂CPSg(h).
Now consider q ∈ CPSg(h). Fix p ∈ CPSf (h), which must exist by Lemma 10; the result just es-
tablished implies that p ∼E(h) q. Then, for every p0 ∈ cl CPS0
f (h), we have q ∼E(h) p ¼E(h) p0. Thus,
q ∈CPSf (h).
Therefore, for every h ∈Ht, CPSf (h)=CPSg(h). Inductively, this implies that CPSf (;)=CPSg(;), and
hence, by (ii) in Theorem 8, f ∼E g.
Axiom B.3, Weak Commitment. Consider t, f ∈ FE, Ht and g as in the Axiom. Analogously to the
notation in the sufﬁciency part of the proof, let Commf (h) be the set of plans that allow 1-period com-
mitment in f (h), where h ∈ Ht; thus, by assumption, for every h ∈ Ht, {[g(h,c)] : c ∈Cg(h)} = {[p] : p ∈
Commf (h)}.
Consider h ∈Ht and an arbitrary history of the form [h,a,D]∈ f . Since every choice c ∈C f ([h,a,D])
corresponds to a plan, Lemma 11 implies that CPS0
f ([h,a,D]) ⊂
S
{[f ([h,a,D],c)] : c ∈ C f ([h,a,D])},
cl CPS0
f ([h,a,D]) ⊃ {[f ([h,a,D],c)] : c ∈ C f ([h,a,D])} and cl CPS0
f ([h,a,D]) = cl {[f ([h,a,D],c)] : c ∈
C f ([h,a,D])}=
S
cl {[f ([h,a,D],c)]:c ∈C f ([h,a,D])}.
Furthermore, for any such continuation history [h,a,D], the assumptions in the Axiom imply that
every p,p0 ∈ CPS0
f ([h,a,D]) satisﬁes p ∼D p0; hence, by Plan Continuity, the same holds for p,p0 ∈
cl CPS0
f ([h,a,D]). Thus, CPSf ([h,a,D])=cl CPS0
f ([h,a,D]).
Now ﬁx h ∈ Ht: it will be shown that cl CPS0
f (h) = cl Commf (h). Consider ﬁrst p ∈ CPS0
f (h), and
let c be its initial choice. Clearly, if c ∈ X, then c ∈ C f (h) and so p ∈ Commf (h). Thus, assume instead
that c ∈ A; then, for every D ∈ Fp(h,c), p([c,D]) ∈ CPSf ([h,c,D]) = cl CPS0
f ([h,c,D]); hence, there is
{pn
c,D} ⊂ CPS0
f ([h,c,D]) such that pn
c,D → p([c,D]). Now deﬁne {pn} ⊂ FE(h) by letting Cpn(;) = {c},
Fpn(;,c) = Fp(;,c) and, for all D ∈ Fp(;,c), pn([c,D]) = pn
c,D. Recall that c ∈ C f (h) and Fp(;,c) =




b ∈C f ([h,c,D])}, pn
c,D ≈ f ([h,c,D],bc,D) for some bc,D ∈C f ([h,c,D]). Therefore, Lemma 4 implies that,
for every n, pn ≈ qn for some qn ∈ Commf (h); hence, qn → p, so p ∈ cl Commf (h). It follows that
cl CPS0
f (h)⊂cl Commf (h).
41Suppose not: then Condition (ii) in the axiom implies that, in particular, f (h,b)E(h) p for any b ∈ B(h).
xiiConversely,ﬁxp ∈clCommf (h),andlet{pn}⊂Commf (h)besuchthatpn →p. Againlet{c}=Cp(;)
and {cn} = Cpn(;). If c,cn ∈ X, then cn ∈ C f (h), which implies that p ∈ cl CPS0
f (h), as required. Thus,
assume that c,cn ∈ A. Then, for all D ∈ Fp(;,c) = Fpn(;,cn), pn([cn,D]) → p([c,D]). Furthermore,
for every n, pn([cn,D]) = f ([h,cn,D],bn) for some bn ∈ C f ([h,cn,D]); but it was shown above that
f ([h,cn,D],bn)∈CPSf ([h,cn,D]). Therefore pn ∈CPS0
f (h), and so p ∈cl CPS0
f (h).
Therefore, as claimed, for every h ∈ Ht, cl Commf (h) = cl CPS0
f (h). On the other hand, by as-
sumption {[g(h,c)] : c ∈ Cg(h)} = {[p] : p ∈ Commf (h)}. In particular, this implies that g(h,c) is
a plan for every c ∈ Cg(h), and so cl CPS0





cl{[p]:p ∈Commf (h)}=clCommf (h)byRemark
B.2. Hence, cl CPS0
g(h) = cl CPS0
f (h), so CPSg(h) = CPSf (h) and hence, inductively, CPSg(;) = CPSf (;),
which implies the claim.
Axiom 3.3, Simpliﬁcation. Let f ∈ F∗
E be as in the Axiom; consider ﬁrst the case B = {c}. Consider
p ∈ CPSf (;,c)(;) and q ∈ CPSf (;). Since CPS0
f (;) ⊃ CPS0
f (;,c)(;), the same holds for the closures of these
sets, and so surely q ¼E p. If the preference is strict, consider a sequence {qn} ⊂ CPS0
f (;) such that
qn → q; then, for n large, qn E p by Plan Continuity. Fix one such n and suppose for deﬁniteness
that qn ∈ CPS0
f (;,bn)(;). Then, a fortiori, for any ¯ qn ∈ CPSf (;,bn)(;), ¯ qn  p. But by (ii) in Theorem 8,
f (;,bn) ∼E ¯ qn and f (;,a) ∼E p, so f (;,bn) E f (;,c), which contradicts the assumptions of the Axiom.
Thus, p ∼E q, which implies that f ∼E f (;,c) as required.
For general B ⊂C f (;), pick any c ∈ B: then, by the above argument, f ∼E f (;,c)∼E f (;,B).
xiii